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ABSTRACT 
America’s open society includes a vast array of critical infrastructure and key 
resources that are vulnerable to terrorist attacks.  While it is not possible to protect or 
eliminate vulnerabilities of all critical infrastructures in the United States, strategic 
improvements can be made to harden these assets and mitigate any damaging effects if an 
attack were to occur.  Current network assessment methods and protective measures are 
inadequate.  As a consequence, the need for a scientific methodology for implementation 
of critical infrastructure protection is required.  A standardized vulnerability 
assessment/risk analysis tool needs to be developed and implemented for the Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Programs to analyze complex networks and examine critical 
nodes.  This will help to prevent, deter, and mitigate the effects against terrorist attack in 
accordance with HSPD-7.  This thesis examines ways that vulnerability analysis is 
currently conducted and it could be improved to establish an all-encompassing 
methodology to identify, prioritize, and protect critical infrastructure.  By analyzing and 
research, this thesis recommends that the National Communications System under the 
DHS establish the required policy initiatives to mandate the National Reliability and 
Interoperability Council’s current and future “best practices,” and set a vulnerability 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
How do officials effectively assess whether terrorists would be successful in 
attacking telecom hotels, and how do they assess the likely consequences of such attacks?     
This is a study of the vulnerabilities of the critical telecommunications industry 
infrastructure in the United States.  The study focuses on “telecom hotels”—large 
facilities that house several network carriers, telephone and internet service providers, 
and Web hosting organizations.   
This study assesses the vulnerability of the telecom industry and investigates the 
possibility that terrorists might be successful in an attack against telecom hotels. This 
information will allow security planners at all levels to devise protective measures based 
on changes in telecommunications regulations or regulatory structure.  This study is 
designed to help the reader understand the ramifications of an attack on the 
telecommunications industry and to provide recommendations for policy regarding 
telecom hotel vulnerabilities. 
What methodology for determining vulnerabilities should be used?  What 
measures are needed to reduce vulnerabilities?   
Several policy options are explored in this thesis.  The first is to determine which, 
if any, agency or organization is in the best position to set strategic security policy for 
telecom hotels, or whether the hotels should be self-regulated.  Several potential 
candidates would be capable of setting policy, including the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC), National Coordinating Center – Information Sharing and Analysis 
Center (NCC-ISAC), Department of Homeland Security, the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration NTIA, and National Security 
Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC).  Once the best agency or 
organization to undertake this mission is identified, the stage must be set for strategic 
policy making.  This is accomplished by establishing potential policies that would help to 
reduce the vulnerabilities in telecom hotels and the telecommunications industry, 
  2 
protecting critical infrastructure.  Finally, a net assessment attempts to ascertain a set of 
vulnerability assessment methods that are scientific, structural, economical, and can be 
replicated.  Most of the sources were found in reports and journals and take an overall 
look at all recommendations, pros and cons, from previous arguments.  A synopsis based 
on personal experience and open source intelligence provides insight from an “outside” 
viewpoint.   
Empirical data to accurately assess the benefits of a strategic policy 
implementation are difficult to find, and this is a common problem for any topic or 
strategy dealing with homeland security or defense.  The terrorist planning cycle may 
span a period of several years for just one tactical operation.  One could argue that there 
have been no attacks on this industry in the United States to date, and that the current 
self-regulated or other non-homeland security telecommunication policies are adequate.  
It is quite possible that many of the strategic changes to homeland security policy have 
not been evaluated for their effectiveness due to the difficulty in the assessment.  The 
criteria for measuring pros and cons of a policy option will naturally be somewhat 
subjective, but a method of weighing and prioritizing each must be included in the 
appraisal.  Another method of assessment may be to create a theoretical change of policy, 
model the changes that occurred in the system, and then note these changes.  This 
method, if possible, would not be easy to accomplish, but it is explored throughout the 
research of this topic. 
 
B. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I provides both an introduction to the thesis and basic overviews of 
critical infrastructure protection and telecommunications networks.  Chapter II addresses 
threats, both physical and cyber, and vulnerabilities of telecom hotels. Chapter III 
presents current network analysis methods, with focus on a standard to correctly analyze 
complex networks; network theory makes possible the precise identification of critical 
components comprising telecom hotels.  The Core Vulnerability Assessment 
Management Program (CVAMP) is a DoD methodology for managing vulnerability 
assessments as part of an anti-terrorism/force protection (AT/FP) campaign.  This chapter 
  3 
concludes with an examination of the Asset Prioritization Model (AMP), as DoD is 
responsible for the Defense Industrial Base for Critical Infrastructure Protections.  
Chapter IV begins with an examination of telco operations, based on interviews with 
experts in the sector.  It briefly describes the current regulatory dilemma and also the 
interdependencies with other critical infrastructure sectors.  Included is a case study of 
the organization of telecommunications within DoD, as well as a look at some telco 
initiatives.  Chapter V provides recommendations for countermeasures against the threats 
and proposes regulatory changes for all responsible organizations, including federal, 
state, local, tribal, and private sector. 
 
C. INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION OVERVIEW 
One of the six critical mission areas defined in the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security is Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP).  The Information and 
Telecommunications Sector is one of thirteen interconnected sectors.  In reducing 
vulnerabilities to the terrorist threat, action must be taken to ensure that critical 
infrastructure and key assets are protected.  The USA PATRIOT Act (Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001) defines critical infrastructure as those  
systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United 
States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would 
have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, 
national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.1   
CIP began in 1995 with Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39), U.S. Policy 
on Counterterrorism. The latest documentation on CIP is the Interim National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (February 2005).  As a result of shifts in the sectors, via 
additional PPDs, there is now a Sector Specific Agency aligned with each sector.  The 
seventeen sectors are Agriculture and Food, Public Health and Healthcare, Water, 
Energy, Banking and Finance, National Monuments and Icons, Defense Industrial Base, 
Information Technology, Telecommunications, Chemical, Transportation Systems, 
                                                 
1 USA Patriot Act is [The] Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, U.S. H.R. 3162, S. 1510, Public Law 107–56, 
SEC. 1016. Critical Infrastructures Protection, (e). 
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Emergency Services, Postal and Shipping, Dams, Government Facilities, Commercial 
Facilities, and Nuclear Reactors, and Materials and Waste.  The Interim NIPP is the first 
integrated effort between federal, state, local, tribal, public, and private entities to 
implement CIP efforts.2   
Effective communication is essential in any business or marriage, and especially 
in a military operation potentially directing the use of nuclear weapons.  The earliest 
known example of CIP was most likely the National Communication System (NCS), 
initially established by President John F. Kennedy in 1963 to form a single unified 
communications system.  Its role was to serve the president, Department of Defense, 
diplomatic and intelligence activities, and civilian leaders.  The NCS charter was to  
link together, improve, and extend, on an evolutionary basis, the 
communications facilities and components of the various federal agencies 
… to provide necessary communications for the federal government under 
all conditions ranging from a normal situation to national emergencies and 
international crisis, including nuclear attack.3   
In 1984, with Executive Order 12472, the NCS focus was changed. The order 
generated the new mission of assisting the president, the National Security Council, the 
director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy and the director of the Office of 
Management and Budget in exercising wartime and non-wartime emergency 
communications responsibilities, while coordinating emergency telecommunications 
planning for the federal government.  Thus, the mission of the NCS developed from a 
centralized, focused role of implementing a single, federal telecommunications system, to 
a rather decentralized, unfocused role of advising and coordinating among several 
entities.  With the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and in 
order to provide better communications support to critical government functions during 
emergencies, the NCS moved from DoD to DHS.4  One system within NCS to help in the 
                                                 
2 Department of Homeland Security, “The Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan,” February 
2005 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Homeland Security, 2005), 3. 
3 Mark D. Baines, Lieutenant Colonel, “The National Telecommunications Infrastructure: A 21st 
Century Organizational Paradox,” Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War 
College, April 7, 2003), 11. 
4 SHARES Bulletin 04–14, March 2004, 
[http://www.ncs.gov/library/SHARES/SHARES%20Bulletin%2014.pdf] Accessed September 17, 2005. 
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HLS mission is the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS), which 
gives priority to the government to gain access to phone networks during an emergency, 
utilizing an access code.5  The Priority Access System (PAS) is similar to GETS, but it 
gives priority to wireless services. For an in-depth overview of the telecommunications 
history, see the Appendix. 
                                                 
5 National Communications System. [http://gets.ncs.gov/] Accessed September 17, 2005. 
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II. TELECOM HOTELS 
A. DEFINITIONS: CIP VS. CYBER-TERRORISM 
Two major aspects are considered when accessing telecommunication hotel 
vulnerabilities.  The problems can be classified as Cyber-Terrorism and Critical 
Infrastructure Protection; so first a clear definition of these problems must be given. 
This telecom vulnerability problem must be classified into a task in order to 
determine the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR).  This is a question of both cyber 
terrorism and critical infrastructure protection.  In trying to define cyber terrorism, the 
two terms are combined.  The definition of cyber is simply computer or computer 
network.  Terrorism is defined by The American Heritage Dictionary as “the unlawful 
use or threatened use of force or violence by a person or an organized group against 
people or property with the intention of intimidating or coercing societies or 
governments, often for ideological or political reasons.” When the definitions are 
combined, the result is “the use or threatened use of force or violence against people or 
property using computers or computer networks.”  In addition, the FBI defines cyber-
terrorism as “The premeditated, politically motivated attack against information, 
computer systems, computer programs, and data which results in violence against 
noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents.”6  Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (CIP) will be defined using the same methodology.  Critical is 
defined as indispensable or essential.  Infrastructure is an underlying base or foundation, 
especially for an organization or system. (It is interesting to note that this definition is 
similar to the English translation of Al Qaeda: "the foundation" or "the base".  Protection 
is defined as the act of protecting, or the state of being protected; preservation from loss, 
injury, or annoyance; defense; shelter, as in, “the weak need protection.”  Combining the 
terms, CIP is defined as protecting the essential foundation of the United States.  In 
redefining the problem, this thesis proves that there are two issues at hand in reducing 
telecommunications vulnerabilities.  The first is to prevent cyber terrorist attacks, and the 
                                                 
6 Mark M. Pollitt, Cyberterrorism – Fact or Fancy? Proceedings of the 20th National Information 
Systems Security Conference, October 1997, 285–289. 
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second is to reduce vulnerabilities by protecting the critical infrastructure.  This paper 
mainly addresses the CIP aspect, but references cyber terrorism when required.  To be 
fully in alignment with the strategic objectives in the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security, a role of minimizing the damage and recovering from possible attacks must also 
be assumed.   
 
B. WHAT IS A TELECOM HOTEL? 
There are many different names that can be used to describe a telecom hotel.  
Some of the more common names are carrier hotel, interconnection facility, colocation 
center (COLO), data center, gateway, network exchange center, commercial internet 
exchange, mondo condo, internet farm, cyber hotel and data bunker.  It is a centrally 
located building that is constructed or rebuilt for datacenters, typically houses network 
carriers, service providers (such as Telcos or Internet service providers), Web hosting 
organizations, and large enterprises.7  
With increasing costs to interconnect large carriers within large regions, these 
telecommunication facilities have, over time, consolidated resources into the critical 
nodes known as telecom hotels.  Economic reasons (as well as the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996 that requires linking LECs (Local Exchange Carriers) and IECs (Inter-
Exchange Carriers), telecommunications companies, Internet ISPs, and businesses) have 
caused companies to co-locate their equipment and services into the same building. This 
saves money, because the infrastructure costs can be shared among a large number of 
tenants.  
There are two main aspects or attributes of telecom hotels.  The first is the 
colocation piece, so that customers can have a place to operate their equipment.  The 
second facet is to facilitate direct cross-connections and to permit access to multiple local 
and long-haul networks. This interconnection aspect is also referred to as “meet-me-
rooms” in which facilities are centrally located within carrier hotels where tenants 
                                                 
7 Tech Web Encyclopedia. 
[http://www.techweb.com/encyclopedia/defineterm.jhtml?term=telecomhotel] Accessed September 17, 
2005. 
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interconnect among themselves and others who desire access to their networks.8  Carrier 
hotels are typically large buildings in major cities, each with a floor that acts as a central 
point of interconnection for all of the carriers.  It is economically attractive to locate a 
network where both customers and vendors can interconnect and the carriers can provide 
better service and lower costs, a business phenomenon known as clustering.  There are 
similarities to IP peering in which IP networks can directly connect to each other.  Core 
Interconnection Facilities can contain not only IP, but also ATM, Frame Relay, 
Synchronous Optical Network (SONET), Synchronous Digital Hierarchy (SDH), (rates, 
protocols and technologies for Telephony), Ethernet, and Wavelength-Division 
Multiplexing (WDM) protocols; therefore, the more networks that are present, the greater 
the savings for all operators and providers.  Another new term to telecom hotels is that of 
a neutral facility, which is owned or operated by a third party, with no partisanship or 
influence to utilize certain carriers.  The antithesis, a non-neutral facility, is likely to be a 
large central office that (again, due to the Telecommunications Act of 1996) had to open 
its doors to CLECs (Competitive Local Exchange Carriers) and provide connection 
points.  In this case, one of the previous Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs), 
such as SBC, Verizon, or Qwest, would own the facility.   In some cases, a carrier may 
own the building, but have it managed by a third party and lease its own space back in 
order to maintain the benefits of a neutral facility.   
                                                 
8 Hunter Newby. “I Now Pronounce You VoIP and Ethernet: Not Just a Marriage of Convenience.” 
Feb, 2004.  Wall Street Technology Association. 
[http://www.wsta.org/publications/articles/0204_article01.html] Accessed September 17, 2005.  
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Figure 1.   Level (3) Communications Gateway/Network Map.9 
 
Carrier Neutral Colocations, sometimes known as Carrier Neutral POPs, 
encourage LECs, CLECs, and other carriers to bring large-capacity fiber infrastructure 
into the facility.  With infrastructure in place from multiple local and long-haul carriers, 
building owners can attract ISPs and other service providers who need this service and 
large capacity connectivity.  A Carrier Neutral POP is also appealing to the CLECs and 
IECs because it can easily interconnect their networks with a simple cross-connect within 
the facility to any other carrier, instead of with costly circuits or fiber construction 
between all facilities.   
The protocol for a carrier-neutral POP or telecom hotel model is as follows.  A 
non-carrier third party provides the physical space near the carriers’ infrastructure. 
Carriers are responsible for extending their cabling infrastructure into the carrier-neutral 
POP.  The third party, sometimes called the landlord, hotelier, or building management 
team, provides floor space to each carrier for equipment racks as well as electrical power, 
                                                 
9 Level (3) Communications, “(3) Center Colocation.” [http://www.level3.com/558.html] Accessed 
September 17, 2005.  
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HVAC, and security.  Carriers are free to negotiate the terms of their inter-connections.  
The third party is merely a facilitator of these negotiations, by providing the facility.10 
A neutral CO (Central Office) gives new entrants to the market access to a 
number of fiber backbone providers, such as Level 3, Williams, MCI, and emerging 
Ethernet providers such as Yipes Communications.  Neutral COs are becoming big 
business as companies such as Core Location, MetroNexux, Equinix, WarnerColo, 
MFNs, CRG West, Cervalis, FIBERNET, and Switch & Data are expanding into major 
telecom hubs. Unlike the initial telecom hotel model where carriers lease physical space 
from a building owner, neutral COs provide air conditioning, backup DC power, HVAC, 
dust control, and high-level security in addition to real estate.   
 
C. PUBLIC INFORMATION 
One of the problems with neutral COs is that they have active marketing 
campaigns, and they post much of the information about their buildings on web pages.  
The web addresses of two of the largest telecom hotels available, one in New York and 
the other in Los Angeles:  http://www.111eighth.com, http://www.onewilshire.com.  
Information available on their web sites includes the exact location of the building and 
building specifications to include electricity, emergency power, HVAC, and fiber optic 
services.  The buildings also advertise their security and life safety systems, floor plans, 
spaces available, other tenants, and details about the building infrastructure and floor 
loading.  The 111 Eighth Avenue building covers an entire New York city block between 
15th and 16th Streets, from Eighth to Ninth Avenues.  It is an immense building and 
contains a huge amount of telecommunications gear.   
                                                 
10 Gratiot County Government, MI, “Appendix VI: Carrier Neutral POP and Circuit Termination 
Guidelines.” 
[http://www.co.gratiot.mi.us/administration/Link_Mich_Report_2004/AppendixVIPhysicalNetwork.pdf] 
Accessed September 17, 2005. 
  12 
 
Figure 2.   One Wilshire Building.11 
 
One major vulnerability to the centers is that much of the information on how to 
exploit design attributes and security flaws of computer networks is freely available on 
the Internet.  CRG West, the management company for the One Wilshire Building, 
claims, “One Wilshire — the most connected building in the world!”12  They also state 
that almost all of the buildings surrounding One Wilshire are connected via an 
underground street conduit.  The building provides a connection point for international 
fiber networks converging with the Pacific Bell tandem switch with undersea cable 
networks and transcontinental transmission resources.  Their customers consist of the 
largest service providers in the world, numbering over 200 voice and data carriers and 
over 400 network and network service providers.  They also mention that the building 
offers three diverse points of entry for fiber optic cabling, with plans to increase this even 
more.  In interviewing building property managers for many telecom hotels, it was 
                                                 
11 One Wilshire, CRG West. [http://www.onewilshire.com/about_us/management.htm] Accessed 
September 17, 2005. 
12 Ibid. 
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discovered that it is up to the customer to maintain the diversity within their own 
network, usually based on the importance and type of traffic flowing through their 
network.   
A service provider with a contract for 911 services or emergency priority services 
would maintain the most diversity and redundancy that was available at the site.  The one 
positive piece of news posted was that CRG West has redundant fiber optic connections 
between the Market Post Tower Meet-Me-Room in San Jose and the One Wilshire Meet-
Me-Room in Los Angeles.  Wikipedia defines a “meet me room” (MMR) as “a place 
within a colocation facility where multiple telecommunication service providers can 
physically connect to one another.  By placing equipment belonging to each service 
provider within an MMR, carriers and enterprises can exchange data without incurring 
local loop fees.”13   
A negative aspect of the web site is that they also state that these two buildings 
are the home of MAE West, which is discussed later in this chapter.  Another drawback 
of Telco web sites is that they allow terrorists to virtually case the location from 
anywhere in the world by offering virtual tours, pictures of the facilities, and pictures of 
features such as cellular antennas, satellite dishes, and back-up power, in addition to 
roadside viewpoints.  In many cases with carrier hotels and their attendant web sites, 




                                                 
13 Wikipedia Encyclopedia. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/] Accessed September 17, 2005. 
14 Switch and Data. [http://www.switchanddata.com/subpage.asp?navid=3&id=18] Accessed 
September 17, 2005. 
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Figure 3.   Mapping functions for Telecom Hotels.15 
 
 
Another large facility in New York is a Carrier-Neutral Interconnection Facility at 
60 Hudson Street, New York; it is described as “one of the world’s busiest carrier hotels” 
and also as “the most important carrier hotel in the world” due to its location and 
relevance to international telecommunications.  Their information, along with many 
others, is listed at http://www.carrierhotels.com.16  Telecom hotels are attractive to 
carriers because they provide high-speed connections (fiber, satellite, microwave), roof 
access for antennas, physical security to include key card access, video surveillance, 
biometric scanners, access control and building escort, power and backup generators, 
VESDA air sampling (imminent fire detection), fire protection, redundant HVAC, and 
seismic strength.  Because these functions are expensive and bothersome for businesses 
to supply on their own, many telecom hotels also contain key assets outsourced by their 
clients. Computers, databases, and other business operating assets are often co-located in 
a telecom hotel.  
                                                 
15 One Wilshire, CRG West. [http://www.onewilshire.com/contact_us/map.htm] Accessed September 
17, 2005.  
16 Carrier Hotels. [http://www.carrierhotels.com] Accessed September 17, 2005. 
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A typical colocation center consists of the following service that are normally 
offered to make the telecom hotels self-sufficient, redundant, and protected:17 
Building:  
• Usually built near a glass fiber ring.  
• Fiber has multiple access points into building to provide diversity.  
• “Clean” rooms to ensure optimal running conditions for computer and network 
hardware.  
• Empty pipe fire suppression. 
• Relay racks, cabinets, or cages for mounting equipment.  
Power: 
• Connected to two or more different power stations/grids.  
• Inline power backup using a system of UPS batteries.  
• Possibility to connect two different grids of power distribution to one server.  
• Most also have backup diesel generator standby to support power delivery.  
Connections: 
• Because of the high concentration of servers inside a colocation center, most 
carriers will be interested in bringing direct connections, to include diverse 
routing.  Service providers can make connections with 20–30 various providers. 
Security: 
• 24/7 monitoring with onsite guards 
• Closed-circuit cameras.  
• Biometric readers 
• Secure Card access entry 
• Worker background checks 
In most cases, larger Internet exchanges will be hosted inside a colocation center 
on which customers can connect for peering.   
Telecom hotels may also be attractive to terrorists, and are among the most 
vulnerable nodes in the telecommunications infrastructure. They are prime targets for  
 
 
                                                 
17 Ted Lewis, “Critical Infrastructure Protection.”  
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asymmetric attacks based on the modus operandi of some large terrorist organizations 
due to the linkage to the U.S. economic sector.  The telecom sector is most vulnerable at 
these telecom hotel facilities. 
 
D. ASSOCIATED CRITICAL NODES: MAE AND NAP 
There are two types of critical nodes that should be associated due to the 
similarities with telecom hotels.  The first is MAE, which initially was referred to as 
MAE East or MAE West.  Computer Knowledge defines MAE as a Metropolitan Area 
Exchange, previously known as Metropolitan Area Ethernet.  It is described as a major 
Internet Network Access Point (NAP) where different providers and networks hand off 
traffic to each other.  This definition sounds remarkably similar to telecom hotels.  A 
company formerly known as MFS (Metropolitan Fiber Service) constructed the first 
MAE outside of Washington, D.C. (known as MAE-East) and then a second in Silicon 
Valley (known as MAE-West).  Through a series of mergers and acquisitions, MFS was 
purchased by WorldCom, which in turn became MCI WorldCom.  The company re-
emerged from bankruptcy in 2004 under the MCI name.  According to the MCI web site, 
MAE® is a registered MCI trademark for Internet exchange services and MAE is not an 
acronym.  MCI MAE facilities are considered carrier-neutral POPs (Point of Presence) 
where customers can interconnect to exchange Internet traffic.  So MAE is specific to 
MCI facilities, but MAE and NAP are becoming synonymous.18  
NAP (Network Access Point) is the second type of associated critical node and a 
major Internet interconnection point that allows Internet access providers and carriers to 
exchange traffic and services with each other.  It seems that the only differences between 
MAE and NAP are when they were initially constructed and who actually built them.  
Another way to look at a NAP is as a hub network for commercial airline carriers.  
Passengers fly on the “Backbone” between hubs and then are exchanged to express, 
connection, or regional carriers so they can get to their ultimate destination.  These 
airport hubs, such as O’Hare in Chicago, DFW in Dallas/Ft. Worth, or Reagan  
                                                 
18 “MAE-Metropolitan Area Exchange (Ethernet),” Computer Knowledge. 
[http://www.cknow.com/ckinfo/questions/414/__print] Accessed September 17, 2005. 
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International in Washington, exchange passengers rather than packets.  (It is interesting to 
note that these major airport hubs are located in the same cities as many of the NAPs and 
MAEs.19) 
As previously noted, MFS established MAE East in 1992, modeled after FIXs 
(Federal Internet Exchange) East and West.  Prior to the commercialization of the 
Internet, three original Internet exchanges were built.  This was to facilitate 
interconnection of the first networks like ARPANET and CSNET to form the Internet.  
Two were FIXs, located in College Park, Maryland, and in Mountain View, California, 
and serving as the connection points for government internets and the Internet.20 The 
third was a CIX (Commercial Internet Exchange) now in Palo Alto, which connected the 
first private internets.21   
The National Science Foundation was charged with setting up four NAPs in order 
to facilitate growth of the commercial Internet.  There were four original NAPs, 
regionalized to facilitate national connections.  One was operated by PacBell in San 
Francisco,22  the second by Ameritech in Chicago,23 the third by Sprint in New York 
(actually in Pennsauken, New Jersey)24 and the fourth by MFS in Washington DC (also 
under the name of MAE-East).25 MAE-East was originally a fiber-optic data ring around 
Washington D.C. established to connect companies inexpensively.  MAE-West was later 
constructed, and both operate, in effect, as NAPs.  Most records account for 11 different 
NAPs.  These include the historic NAPs (CIX, FIX-East, FIX-West), the four original 
NAPs listed above and four new MAE locations: MAE West in San Jose, MAE Los 
Angeles, MAE Dallas and MAE Chicago.  There are additional NAPs being constructed 
constantly.  Some additional NAPs coming soon are MAE Houston and “Big East” by 
                                                 
19 NAP of the Americas. [http://www.napoftheamericas.net/faq.cfm] Accessed September 17, 2005. 
20 National Aeronautics and Space Administration. [http://www.arc.nasa.gov/] Accessed September 
17, 2005. 
21 United States Internet Service Provider Association. [http://www.cix.org] Accessed September 17, 
2005. 
22 SBC Communications Inc. [http://www.aads.net/pdf.html] Accessed September 17, 2005. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Sprint Corporation. [www.sprintlink.net] Accessed September 17, 2005. 
25 MCI Inc. [http://www.mae.net/fac/mae-east.htm] Accessed September 17, 2005. 
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ICS Network Systems, headquartered in Bohemia, New York.  All information about the 
“Big East” location has been removed from the corporate web site.26  
Another NAP is described as a tenant of a telecom hotel.  This telecom hotel is 
named and marketed as TECOTA (Technology Center of the Americas).  One of the 
tenants is NAP of the Americas, which links the fiber networks of Latin America with 
North America.  TECOTA is located at 50 NE 9th Street, Miami, FL, 33132.  In addition 
to this NAP, the company has a new one, NAP of the Americas/West in Santa Clara, 
California.27 There are also many unconfirmed or self-proclaimed NAPs like ATLNAP 
in Atlanta, Georgia, MAE-Houston, the Baltimore NAP, and the Tucson NAP.28  
In addition to those listed above, MCI has increased its number of MAEs, and 
they are classified as MAE East, MAE West, MAE Central and MAE Miami.  MAE 
West consists of two locations in San Jose and one in Los Angeles.  One location in San 
Jose is located at 55 S Market St., which is housed at the Market Post Tower telecom 
hotel. Information about this location states that the building offers three diverse points of 
entry for the fiber conduits.   This is the same number of fiber entry points described for 
the One Wilshire location in downtown Los Angeles, which is connected to the MAE-LA 
location.  MAE East is comprised of four locations: one in New York and three in 
Washington D.C. (Vienna, Reston and Ashburn, VA), one of which is located at 1919 
Gallows Rd Vienna, VA 22182-3964.  MAE Miami has only one location and MAE 
Central has two locations, one in Dallas and one in Chicago.29   Tallying the four original 
NAPs, the three historic NAPs and the additional nine MAEs, there are at least 16 NAPs, 
not including some of the smaller, lesser known NAPs listed above.  It can be deduced 
that MAEs and NAPs are synonomous and that they are the Internet traffic portion of 
telecom hotels.  Add this to the telephony traffic in a facility to equal a telecom hotel.  
                                                 
26 SearchWebServices. 
[http://searchwebservices.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid26_gci214106,00.html] Accessed September 17, 
2005. 
27 NAP of the Americas. [http://www.napoftheamericas.net/faq.cfm#1L] Accessed September 17, 
2005. 
28 Indonesian Internet Society. [http://www.isoc-
id.org/iidp/table_5_selected_us_networks_exchange_points.php] Accessed September 17, 2005. 
29 MCI Inc. [http://www.mae.net/peer/] Accessed September 17, 2005.  
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For practical purposes and close associations, the physical locations of MAEs, NAPS and 
international cable landings will be included in this study as telecom hotels.   
 





The telecommunications sector must cope with natural and human threats every 
day.  These threats include natural weather events like tornados, hurricanes, and flooding, 
and unintentional events like fiber cuts and maintenance or power outages.  Other human 
threats would consist of physical and cyber sabotage from insiders.    A fiscal threat also 
exists due to the economic downturn in the industry in the past few years.  This has 
                                                 
30 MCI Inc. MCI Network illustrating International Cable Landings and Data Centers 
[http://global.mci.com/about/network/global_presence/northamerica/mci_global_presence_NORTHAMER
ICA.pdf] Accessed September 17, 2005.  
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caused companies to spend capital on operations instead of research and development, 
recapitalizing, securing, and enhancing the infrastructure.   
Is there a valid terrorist threat?  Specific threats to the telecom industry or toward 
the telecom infrastructure sector from actionable intelligence are beyond the scope of this 
unclassified paper.  There have been general threats and information released about the 
financial district in New York and New Jersey, and specific buildings that have been 
monitored and targeted for attacks.  Al-Qaeda has not engaged in cyber attacks in the 
past; however, Usama Bin Laden has suggested that Al-Qaeda has the expertise to use the 
computer as a weapon.31  (The 9/11 attacks documented the secondary effects on the 
telecom infrastructure that existed either on the twin towers or in their basements.)  In 
limiting the discussion to Al Qaeda, it has been reported that some members have been 
trained in cyber terrorism and have researched U.S. CIP web sites.  Is there a desire or 
intent to attack telecom hotels?  The desire for causing mass casualties would not be 
gained by attacking telecom hotels, but one goal of Al Qaeda has been to economically 
destroy the U.S.   
A terrorist attack can cause mass disruption of the many interconnected layers of 
systems.  U.S. Northern Command utilizes SOSAs (System Of Systems Analysts) to 
explore what effect the damage to one system or sector would have on another.  These 
concentrations of the sector’s key assets are becoming attractive targets even if they have 
not been directly targeted by terrorists in the past.   
There are many forms in which threats can arrive, some of which may not be 
known or even imagined.  Physical attacks, electromagnetic attacks, cyber attacks, or a 
combination of all of these methods can occur on a network if the terrorist or group is 
well trained.32   
 
                                                  
31 Joyce E. Elliott, Colonel, “Cyber Terrorism: A Threat to National Security,” Strategy Research 
Project, U.S. Army War College, April 9, 2002.   
32 Investigative Research for Infrastructure Assurance (IRIA) Group – Institute for Security 
Technology Studies, “Information and Telecommunications Sector Vulnerabilities and Threats,” (Hanover, 
DE: Dartmouth College, 2002), 2.  
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2. Physical 
Physical attacks like 9/11, using sophisticated hi-jacking schemes, take an 
enormous amount of money and training, but simple Vehicle Borne Improvised 
Explosive Devices (VBIEDs)—like the ones used daily in Iraq—are probably the most 
likely and, potentially, the most deadly.  Physical threats are probably the greatest threat 
to critical communication nodes like telecom hotels and NAPs.  Aside from the potential 
loss of life, there is also a major financial loss in the equipment in a telecom hotel, and 
additionally a great psychological aspect when people cannot communicate or get 
information after an attack.  The easiest and most likely physical attack would come from 
a bomb or IED (Improvised Explosive Device).  These take minimal skill to put together, 
are easy to acquire, and simple to deploy.  The effects of a simultaneous attack on half a 
dozen critical nodes could cause a major regional outage for at least short amounts of 
time.  One problem with Telcos is that the perception of the likelihood of a major attack 
is comparatively low when analyzing it with the routine damage and disruptions like the 
accidental damage to telecommunications lines from a backhoe.    
Electromagnetic (EM) attacks, Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) or High Powered 
Microwave (HPM) could be the most economically devastating weapons.  EMP, RF 
(Radio Frequency), or HPM, while possible, have been considered unlikely in both the 
September 2002 study, “Information and Telecommunications Sector Vulnerabilities and 
Threats,” by the Investigative Research for Infrastructure Assurance (IRIA) Group’s 
Institute for Security Technology Studies33 and by all service providers surveyed.  Most 
buildings are not fully hardened, but are RF shielded/protected and not vulnerable to less 
sophisticated weapons of this nature.  It is easy to recognize the old Bell Central offices, 
as they are typically square brick buildings with no windows, part of the shielding design.  
Smaller powered attacks would result in a computer re-boot or a dropped call without any 
major damage.  Also, even a major RF type attack would result in equipment failure or 
damage, but no personnel casualties.   
Lastly, a chemical, biological, or radiological attack is possible against a telecom 
hotel.  Most of the buildings do not have adequate ventilation or filtration systems and 
                                                 
33 IRIA Group, Institute for Security, 2002, 2. 
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would be susceptible to such an attack.  The result would be limited, as the buildings 
typically house enormous amounts of equipment and not many telecom personnel.  Most 
equipment would continue to run after such an attack, so an open-air gathering place, 
such as a sporting event or mall, would be a more likely place of attack.   
3. Cyber 
Cyber attacks, Denial of Service (DoS), worms, virus attacks, and hacking may be 
the most difficult to deter.  Cyber attacks (termed Network Centric Warfare, or NCW, by 
the military) on our military, economic, or telecommunications infrastructure can now be 
launched from all reaches of the globe, and can be used to transport the problems of a 
distant conflict directly to the homeland.34  There is a growing connectivity between 
secure and insecure networks, creating new opportunities for unlawful intrusions into 
sensitive or proprietary computer systems within critical U.S. infrastructures, such as the 
nation’s telephone system.  Companies make it easier to control their networks from 
remote locations to save on the costs of physically traveling to fix or upgrade software or 
services.  This operations advantage is also a security disadvantage.  Allowing company 
access to remote terminals or servers can also allow unauthorized access to the same 
facilities.  Another issue with protecting the telephony critical infrastructure is that the 
complexity of computer networks is growing faster than the ability to understand and 
protect them.  Proprietary information makes it difficult to identify critical nodes, verify 
security, and monitor activity of these networks.   
More resources are being dedicated for Critical Infrastructure Protection, but there 
is an insufficient amount being spent on stopping a well-planned cyber attack.  A 
successful cyber attack on routers or DNS servers would require a high level of technical 
ability, but would be devastating to the IT community.  There are many cyber controls 
(firewalls, system configurations, intricate password systems, awareness training, and 
new standards for IP security) available to prevent cyber terrorism.  One problem is that 
these controls are underutilized and sometimes bypassed by security personnel for ease of 
running the network.  One of the most damaging cyber scenarios includes an insider who 
                                                 
34 Jacques S. Gansler and Hans Binnenkijk, “Information Assurance: Trends in Vulnerabilities, 
Threats, and Technologies,” Working Paper, National Defense University, 2003, 21.  
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has specialized knowledge and is working for a foreign nation or terrorist group.  While 
the damage of this scenario is catastrophic, the likelihood is deemed as low. 
Now that the threats are known, who are the actors that will attack these 
networks? Al-Qaeda has previously been mentioned as one of the groups of terrorists 
willing to attack.  Another group are the hackers who threaten networks for thrill or 
notoriety, but aren’t a major threat to critical defense infrastructure.  The next group is 
labeled “Hacktivists” and is a slightly bigger threat, because such people possess a 
motive to carry out an attack.35  This group uses hacking to further its activist goals.  
Another medium-level threat is from industrial spies and organized crime groups.  Their 
motivation is monetary and must be considered a potential threat.  Terrorists are at the top 
of the list for many, due to the malice they have for those who are against their cause.  
Many people discount the terrorists’ abilities to conduct a cyber attack because of their 
apparent preference for deadly explosions versus attacks that may create an economic 
downturn or limited network chaos.  One of the largest threats for the U.S. Military is 
from state actors and national governments.36  These cyber warfare programs are more 
sophisticated and receive the required funding.  Even if their only purpose is to gather 
information, rather than shut down military systems, a disclosure of classified 
information to these entities could be devastating to national security.  One of the fears 
from any of these groups is that technology will feed into new methods or complexity of 
cyber attacks.  Some even fear software “agents” that have some form of intelligence to 
gather or conduct information operations. 
4. DoD Example 
U.S. government and defense networks are becoming increasingly reliant on the 
private industry.  Commercial software is also replacing relatively secure proprietary 
network systems by U.S. telecommunications providers and other operators of critical 
infrastructure.  As more and more U.S. software companies go offshore for their 
                                                 
35 Lawrence K. Gershwin, “Cyber Threat Trends and U.S. Network Security,” Statement for the 
Record to the Joint Economic Committee, National Intelligence Council, June 21, 2001. 
[http://www.cia.gov/nic/NIC_speeches.html] Accessed September 17, 2005. 
36 Lieutenant General Kenneth Minihan, USAF, “Vulnerabilities of the National Information 
Infrastructure,” Testimony to the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Hearing, June 24, 1998. 
[http://hsgac.senate.gov/62498minihan.htm] Accessed September 17, 2005. 
  24 
programming expertise, many of these products will provide opportunities for foreign 
exploitation or insertion of attack tools, threatening national security.  Convergence of 
voice, data, and video onto one network is leaving the military susceptible to a physical 
attack on critical infrastructure, just as convergence to a few software systems makes the 
nation more vulnerable to a cyber attack.  A final note on commercial software reliance is 
that as the technology revolution continues, civilian technology will increasingly drive 
military technology, and enemies will be able to concentrate their attack on the less 
secure civilian sector, thus causing a cascading effect to the defense sector. 
Is a successful attack, either cyber or physical, possible?  Using the DoD 
networks, which are some of the most protected networks available as an example, the 
answer is an astounding yes.  ER 97, or Eligible Receiver 1997, was a JCS (Joint Chiefs 
of Staff) exercise to check the vulnerabilities in the military’s critical infrastructure and 
computer networks.  Four days of hacking, using COTS (Commercial Off The Shelf) 
products, crippled the DoD computer systems.37  The exercise utilized hackers from NSA 
to attack DoD networks using commercially available tools.  The results showed DoD not 
only that vulnerabilities existed in the national information infrastructure, but that 
deficiencies also existed in the ability to counter or respond to those attacks.  There is a 
close connection between telecommunications networks and the internet, in that all 
internet traffic rides on telecom infrastructure due to convergence.  Not only are phone 
calls to mom affected in a failure, but also all internet traffic.  This includes B2B 
(Business to Business) traffic, banking/financial market transactions, and all government 
coordination activity and email. Again, this was evidenced by both the first World Trade 
Center attack and the events of 9/11.38 The devastating effects of taking out a small 
portion of the telecom infrastructure were evident, as virtually all communications in 
lower Manhattan were inoperable on September 11, 2001.  Among the hardest hit were 
services provided by the telecom giant Verizon.39 
                                                 
37 Minihan, Vulnerabilities. 
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Is it really feasible that terrorists would get into the most vital systems, or is this 
just in theory?  A presentation from the SANS Institute listed the .mil or .gov domains 
that had been hacked within a 100-day window.  Thirty-seven sites were listed, including 
web sites maintained by the Army, Navy, and NASA.40  The presentation goes on to 
discuss how companies like Microsoft issued security bulletins to warn their users of 
vulnerabilities in the programs.  This concept also lets potential hackers know of the 
same vulnerabilities.  At that point, the race is on for hackers to develop malicious code 
to attack a system and for company programmers to develop a software patch to eliminate 
the vulnerability.  More proof comes from testimony from the director of Central 
Intelligence to Congress that “computer-based information operations could provide the 
enemy with an asymmetric response, thus degrading the U.S. military superiority, and 
that attacks on the military or telecommunications infrastructure can be launched from 
anywhere in the world.”41 
The “Honeynet Project” was a study in which computers were placed on the 
Internet to see how quickly hackers would find and attack them.  The average timeframe 
was eight hours, but, if on a university system, the average time was reduced to only 45 
minutes.42   Further proof that vulnerabilities exist is found in the testimony of Lieutenant 
General Minihan, who was the director of the National Security Agency (NSA) at the 
time of this Senate Committee Hearing.  One example mentioned in his statement was 
that the nation, and specifically DoD, faces significant threats due to its dependence on 
cyberspace and worldwide connectivity.43  He also emphasized the vulnerabilities 
through the previously noted Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) exercise, Eligible Receiver 97.   
 
F. VULNERABILITIES 
The majority of the telecom infrastructure protection problem lies in its 
vulnerabilities. It is difficult to determine the amount of vulnerability within the sector, as 
                                                 
40 Alan Paller, “Fighting Back Against Cybercrime: What Works?” The SANS Institute, 2004. 
[www.sans.org] Accessed September 17, 2005. 
41 Gershwin, Cyber Threat Trends.  
42 Ibid. 
43 Minihan, Vulnerabilities. 
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much of it is privately owned.  In addition, if there are vulnerabilities, no company or 
government office or agency would want to reveal such weaknesses.  Some of these 
vulnerabilities are based in the economics of scale and the technology improvements 
within the telecom and IT (Information Technology) fields.  The evolution of switching 
technology is one development that has resulted in a concentration of assets, or 
clustering..   There is a concentration of control in switches, due to fewer switches being 
deployed, and therefore a greater susceptibility to damage from a terrorist attack.  The 
continued concentration of an assortment of transmissions into single large buildings, due 
to convergence, has already been mentioned.  This has changed the infrastructure into a 
series of key critical nodes or key assets.  A catastrophic failure to such a building would 
cause a disruption of almost all communications, to include internet services (email, 
LAN, WAN, dial-up services), wireless internet, local and long distance phone service, 
cellular phone service, satellite communications, and paging services from an abundance 
of telecom or internet service providers.44  
General weaknesses reported in open source publications have listed several areas 
of vulnerability in telecommunications infrastructure, to include telecom hotels, Internet 
peering points, trusted access to telecommunications facilities, equipment chain of 
control issues, cable landings, and International Gateways (locations where internet and 
voice traffic arrives from submarine cable or satellite downlinks).  There are only a few 
connections points for traffic with Europe and Asia.  These physical facilities include 
thousands of switches and components that make up the telecom infrastructure.   
Another concern in the overall telecom infrastructure is the vulnerability of two 
billion miles of underground fiber in many remote areas, primarily along easements and 
rights of way.  There are larger amounts of traffic being transmitted along these optical 
fibers, which allow fewer transmission routes and increased concentrations of traffic 
along less diverse routes.   
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Lastly, the Public Switched Telephone Networks (PSTN) are very reliant on 
software in a time when computer viruses and worms are becoming more and more 
prevalent.   
Possibly the best list of telecom vulnerabilities, compiled by the Network 
Reliability and Interoperability Council (NRIC) VI,45  listed eight separate influences in 
the telecommunications industry that could conceivably be vulnerabilities:  
• Environment:  Buildings, conduits, right of way 
• Power:  Interdependency with Power sector, HVAC, batteries, generators 
• Hardware:  Hardware frames, electronics, copper and fiber optic cables 
• Software:  Software releases, beta or test loads, version management and control 
• Networks:  Configuration of NEs (Network Elements), types of networks, 
Protocols, diversity 
• Payload:  Data packets, overhead, statistics, corruption 
• Policy:  Industry standards, governmental mandates, legal issues 
• Human:  Deliberate and accidental behavior, education 
                                                 
45 Network Reliability and Interoperability Council VI, Homeland Security Physical Security Focus 
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III. VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
Because there is no standardized methodical approach for analyzing complex 
networks, managers of these networks are restricted in their capability to identify and 
reduce vulnerabilities.  Current network assessment methods and protective measures are 
not deliberate actions, and the need for a scientific methodology for implementation of 
critical infrastructure protection is required.  Also, it is economically impossible to 
eliminate all vulnerabilities, so prioritization of funds must occur.  A recent proposal, 
called Model-Based Vulnerability Analysis (MBVA), merges analysis with risk 
assessment and risk reduction.46  Another method is the Department of Defense’s Core 
Vulnerability Assessment Management Program (CVAMP).   
 
A. MBVA 
While telecom hotels have existed in one form or another for years and have been 
determined to be a vulnerable aspect of the telecommunications sector, there have been 
no studies to assess the specific vulnerabilities, or methods to remedy or reduce those 
vulnerabilities.  This research is intended to serve as a basis for evaluating telecom hotel 
vulnerabilities and establish a standard for all private industry infrastructure owners.  An 
initial assessment of telecom hotels will be made using the Model-Based Vulnerability 
Analysis (MBVA) method.  There are five steps in that provide a comprehensive method 
of analysis: 47  
a. Asset Inventory 
b. Network Analysis 
c. Fault Tree Analysis 
d. Event Tree Analysis 
e. Budget Allocation 
 
 
                                                 
46 Ted G. Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security: Defending a Networked 
Nation, (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2004).  
47 Ibid.  
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1. Telecom Hotel Example MBVA 
The first step in the MBVA process is building an inventory of all assets that 
comprise the infrastructure.  This starts with the vulnerabilities listed above and include 
environment, power, hardware, software and human.  The list is limited to those 
vulnerabilities associated with telecom hotels.    
• Environment:  buildings, conduits, and risers where fiber enters and 
exits the building, air conditioned spaces with fire protection 
• Power:  HVAC, backup power, batteries, generators 
• Hardware:  due to convergence, almost all types of telecom and IT 
equipment would be present in a telecom hotel, including switches, 
routers, hubs, transmission equipment, multiplexors, computers, fiber, 
copper, cat 5 cabling, equipment racks, etc. 
• Software:  software releases, beta or test loads, network operations 
management software 
• Payload:  the type of data and services provided by operators 
• Human: personnel operating out of the telecom hotel 
Other items that are not located with the telecom hotels, but need to be included 
due to association, are the network operations centers, data backup, and storage centers, 
and diverse routing of all networks that are present within the telecom hotel.  One point 
of distinction is that the list above would be accurate for an ILEC who is responsible for 
both the building and his own network.  One of the problems with CIP, in reference to a 
telecom hotel, is that there are several different responsibilities in which everyone must 
play his part.    In a neutral telecom hotel, the building owner and management are only 
looking at the aspects of the building.  Service providers and operators are only looking at 
the equipment and assets within their designated colocation spaces. This makes it 
difficult to determine the effects of the loss of a telecom hotel as there are many tenants 
with very different types of networks and services.    
The next step in the MBVA process is to construct a network model to show 
relationships and linkages.   



































= Nodes (Telecom Hotel)
= Links (Fiber Routes) 
Note: Colors used to denote ring topology used to build in redundancy  
Figure 5.   Generic Nationwide Fiber Network. 
 
This modeling will assist in determining if the network is scale free, small world, 
or random.  The first two are defined in Network Theory as complex networks and the 
latter is a simple network.  Scale free networks have a few highly connected “hubs” and 
the rest of the nodes have a low degree of connections.  Small world networks are nodes 
that can reach all other nodes with a small number of hops and similarly illustrates the 
hypothesis of six degrees of separation between all persons on earth.  Random networks 
are as defined, random and unstructured.48  At this point, network hubs or critical nodes 
and links are identified.  The example uses an entire fiber optic network as seen by an 
IEC.  In actuality, there would be hundreds of metro fiber rings located throughout a 
major city that would connect through a telecom hotel and identify it as the critical node.  
For simplicity, and lack of access to this detailed proprietary information, a basic national 
view was used.  Perhaps a different picture is required to demonstrate the single point of 
failure in getting to the IEC backbone.  Also, note the bigger “pipes” associated with the 
COs and telecom hotel on the right side of the diagram.  
                                                 
48 Ted G. Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection).  














Figure 6.   LEC connection to IEC network via Telecom Hotels.49 
 
 
Using the scale free test histogram, it can be seen that the network is, in fact, scale 
free.  One other observation from the topology diagram, above, is that there are no critical 
links in the fiber routes.  This is due to the diversity and redundancy of a ring topology.   
                                                 
49  Ted Lewis, “Critical Infrastructure Protection.”  
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Figure 7.   Scale Free Test Histogram  
 
 
The third step is building a fault tree and recognizing specific vulnerabilities that 
are associated with the critical node that was identified in the previous step.  Fault tree 
models depict potential vulnerabilities associated with the hubs from the initial network 
modeling.  This illustration depicts a failure to a telecom hotel and the vulnerabilities that 
are associated.  Analyzing the fault tree model using an event tree is the fourth step in the 
MBVA process.  Fault tree analysis depicts all possible faults and estimates their 
probability of successful attack resulting in a failure.   
It is important to state that the probability assumptions noted in the subsequent 
illustrations are only assumptions.  The examples precisely demonstrate the need to 
employ an appropriate methodology like the in-depth analysis of JSIVA, to establish the 
likelihood of component failure.  The results of JSIVA, or other vulnerability assessment 
tools, would be complementary to the MBVA process, especially when allocating limited 
funding.   For the illustration, percentages were scaled for the probability of the threat 
succeeding if an attack occurred.  Five percent was considered a low threat, 15% would 
be a medium threat, and 25–30% was considered to have a high probability of success.  
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The probabilities in the example are estimates from the subject matter experts who were 
interviewed during the research process.  Their experience and knowledge are from 
engineering and physical security backgrounds in the telecommunications sector.  
Sources of estimates for probabilities could also come from historical data, exercises, or 























The event tree illustrates the enumeration of all possible outcomes of the fault tree 
and shows the consequences of a failure or adverse event.  Starting with an initiating 
event, the consequences are followed through a series of possible paths, and each path 
has an assigned probability of occurrence.  For N vulnerabilities in the fault tree, there are 
2N possible outcomes in the event tree.  In the example, five vulnerabilities give 32 
possible outcomes.  The total probability of successful attack resulting in failure in this 
example is 60%, which is the same result determined by both the fault tree and event tree 
analyses. 
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N vulnerabilities = 2N possible outcomes
 
Figure 9.   Event Tree Analysis for Telecom Hotels. 
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Figure 10.   Financial Risk and Fault Risk Calculations.50 
                                                 
50 Center for Homeland Defense and Security, Allocate Simulation, August 2005. 
[https://www.chds.us/course/studies.cfm?course_id=77&cci=animation_test] Accessed September 17, 
2005. 
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The final step in the MBVA process is analyzing the budget to optimally allocate 
resources.  This involves developing an investment plan that minimizes the chances of 
faults occurring, as identified by the fault distribution. 
In this case, both the fault reduction program and the financial risk program 
calculated very similar results.  This is due in part to many of the failures having similar 
estimated damage costs and recovery costs.  The main emphasis is to allocate 89% of  
resources toward reducing cyber and bomb attacks.  Another 7% will be allocated toward 
both cyber and fiber protection, and 3% should go toward reducing fiber and bomb 
vulnerabilities. Allocating resources in this way, the associated risk will be reduced from 
72% down to 12%.   
There are advantages and disadvantages to every vulnerability assessment 
methodology; MBVA is no exception.  Model-based vulnerability analysis provides 
analysts with a comprehensive tool for accomplishing critical infrastructure protection 
under budgetary constraints.51  MBVA is a thorough method of examination that brings 
together network, fault, event, and risk analysis, as an integrated process in an effort to 
mathematically optimize, quantitatively evaluate, and justify funding for critical nodes 
such as telecom hotels.52   
A limitation of model-based vulnerability analysis is that fault and event trees are 
static in nature and do not provide sequencing of events.  Numerous fault trees would be 
required to analyze an entire sector, and once that was done, the resulting event trees 
would grow at an alarming rate.  For N vulnerabilities in a fault tree, one must list 2N 
possible outcomes in the event tree.  Also, because it is often difficult to obtain valid 
systems reliability data from vendors, the probabilities derived from a quantitative FTA 
are approximate in nature.  It is also necessary to be able to estimate the probability of a 
successful attack and the costs associated, and these will be approximate at best.  Lastly, 
“least squares” is used in the optimization during the allocation phase, which can be 
sensitive to estimates.  
                                                 
51 Ted Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection. 
52 Ibid. 
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Despite the limitations, MBVA provides an essential methodology needed to 
prevent, protect, and mitigate damage to critical telecom hotels, while effectively 
examining associated risks.  MBVA also assists with the management of limited 
resources by concentrating on the identification of critical nodes and the prioritization of 
“hardening” the most important systems. 
 
B. CVAMP 
Core Vulnerability Assessment Management Program is a DoD web-based 
application that captures results of vulnerability assessments, prioritizes areas of 
responsibility vulnerabilities, identifies deficiencies, and lists corrective actions needed or 
completed.53  Vulnerability Assessments are typically conducted using the DoD standard, 
JSIVA, or Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment. 
 
 
Figure 11.   365 Main Building, San Francisco.54 
                                                 
53 Defense Threat Reduction Agency Link, Combat Support. 
[http://www.dtra.mil/toolbox/directorates/cs/programs/assessments/joint_staff.cfm] Accessed September 
17, 2005. 
54 365 Main Inc. [http://www.365main.net/company.html] Accessed September 17, 2005.  
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CVAMP was initially developed by U.S. European Command and has been in use 
since 1998. It has since been adopted by all services and combatant commands.  Initially, 
many commands had inadequate Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) vulnerability 
management programs.  DoD Directive 2000.12 (Aug 2003) addressed this shortfall and 
directed the Joint Staff to maintain a centralized vulnerability database. 55 
This program is only accessible on the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network 
(SIPRNET) to authorized users via the Antiterrorism Enterprise Portal (ATEP). The 
CVAMP Process has several steps that include tracking and managing AT vulnerabilities, 
generating justification for requirements to resolve vulnerabilities, standardizing and 
automating the AT resource request process, and highlighting AT readiness shortfalls due 
to unmitigated vulnerabilities. 
 
 
Figure 12.   CVAMP Process.56 
                                                 
55 Major Robert Gray, USAF, J34 Assessments Branch. [https://www.noradnorthcom.mil/j3/j34] 
Accessed September 17, 2005.  
56 Ibid.  
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Once a person gains access to ATEP, he or she can follow the process, which 
eventually results in the threats being mitigated.  The main steps are: to create the 
organization, to create a vulnerability assessment using JSIVA,  to create observations 
and respective corrective actions, to release the vulnerability and create a justification,  to 
create and release prioritized funding requests, and to mitigate the threat once funding is 
received. 
This methodology follows a different funding procedure.  Rather than assign 
funds that will go into CIP, the CVAMP process discovers vulnerabilities that must be 
mitigated and then acquires the funding to mitigate the threat.  Using this procedure, 
funds are not spent only in areas of homeland security that have no requirement.  This 
also ensures that funds are put into the programs where justified and not “skimmed off” 
to pet projects or non-critical mission areas.  There are two funding mechanisms in this 
process.  The first is a special fund for combating terrorism and is called the Combating 
Terrorism Readiness Initiatives Fund (CbTRIF).  The second mechanism is an Unfunded 
Requirement (UFR) as part of the DoD Planning, Programming, Budgeting and 
Execution (PPBE) System. 
1. JSIVA 
Possibly the biggest part of the CVAMP program is the Joint Staff Integrated 
Vulnerability Assessments (JSIVA) process.  This was initially a Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency (DTRA) derived model that was conducted annually at DoD 
installations worldwide.  The teams determine vulnerabilities and provide options to 
assist installation commanders in mitigating or overcoming them.  The JSIVA team 
concept was in place well before 9/11, and in fact, was formed following the 1996 
terrorist attack on Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia.   A taskforce studied the security, force 
protection funding, resources and coordination of intelligence and antiterrorism 
countermeasures, not only at Khobar Towers, but across the board.57  The report revealed 
that DoD did not have published standards for force protection at fixed facilities.  A new 
instruction, DoD STANDARD 26: Higher Headquarters (HHQs) Vulnerability 
Assessments (VAs) (DoDI 2000.16, DoD AT Stds), requires each installation to have 
                                                 
57 Defense Threat Reduction Agency Link. [http://www.dtra.mil/] Accessed September 17, 2005.  
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higher headquarters anti-terrorism and force protection assessments at least every three 
years.  DTRA continues to help installations meet this requirement, along with service 
and combatant command AT/FP personnel through JSIVAs.   
The JSIVA process takes an all hazards look at any military installation or 
facility.  There are teams that conduct either a five-day JSIVA or a three-day Higher 
Headquarters Vulnerability Assessment (HHQVA) as mentioned above.  This program is 
in the process of expanding into the Defense Industrial Base (DIB).  The JSIVA teams 
consist of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) in the following areas:  Security Operations 
(Blue Team), Terrorist Operations (Red Team), Emergency Management (CBRNE, 
Medical, Fire vulnerabilities), structural engineering, and infrastructure (cyber, tenant 
commands, other areas).  Once the vulnerability assessment is accomplished, the results 
are briefed to the base commander.  A final report is completed approximately 60 days 
later; the results go into the CVAMP database and are also sent to the appropriate service 
chain of command and the secretary of defense.   
As part of the JSIVA, the Carver Matrix is used to provide both an offensive and 
a defensive methodology. A qualitative and quantitative vulnerability assessment is used 
to evaluate a facility.58   The following are the key factors of the Carver Matrix: 
criticality, accessibility, recoverability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability.  The 
Carver Methodology is also used in Target Analysis/Vulnerability Assessment (TAVA), 
which is used by the civilian sector.  Another civilian tool used is a combination of Petri 
network theory and risk analysis.  The following are the six steps involved in risk 
analysis that follow similar lines as both MBVA and JSIVA: 1) Identify system 
characteristics, 2) identify threats to network assets, 3) identify vulnerabilities to the 
specified threats, 4) identify methodologies and procedures to counter threats and reduce 
vulnerabilities, 5) identify residual risks, and 6) prioritize recommendations for reducing 
residual risks.  A benefit of this process is that it looks at behavioral modeling of highly 
complex and highly distributed systems.   
                                                 
58 “Target Analysis and Vulnerability Assessment,” Homeland Defense Journal Online. 
[http://www.homelanddefensejournal.com/conf_TAVA.htm] Accessed September 17, 2005.  
  42 
An even more in-depth assessment conducted by DTRA is called the Balanced 
Survivability Assessment (BSA).  BSAs identify and assess vulnerabilities in the nation’s 
critical infrastructure systems.  It takes approximately three months for teams of 12–14 
specialists to conduct these detailed, multidiscipline assessments of critical infrastructure 
key nodes.  They recommend a series of changes to reduce vulnerabilities and continue to 
support long-term strategic risk management investment.  
 
Figure 13.   Telecom Hotel Interior View.59 
 
2. JAT Guide 
Another tool used by the military is the Joint Antiterrorism Program Managers 
Guide (JAT Guide).  This is an electronic program management and decision aid tool to 
assist installation commanders in developing an antiterrorism program. The JAT Guide is 
a three-CD set that includes the requirements, planning processes, templates and tools to 
produce and manage a total antiterrorism program. The guide provides consistent and 
effective antiterrorism program management across the Department of Defense, and 
allows commanders to prioritize risk and compete for funding on an equal basis.60  The 
JAT guide is modeled on and uses the military decision making process.  The five-step 
process is: mission receipt, mission analysis, course of action (COA) development, COA 
approval, and orders production.  This process is based on the commander’s intent and 
                                                 
59 Carrier Hotels. [http://www.carrierhotels.com/properties/ragingwire/index.shtml] Accessed 
September 17, 2005. 
60 U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center. 
[http://www.erdc.usace.army.mil/pls/erdcpub/www_org_info.show_page?f_id=143318&f_parent=55173] 
Accessed September 17, 2005.  
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can be analyzed using the following questions: what is the threat, what is critical, what 
are the risks, what are options to mitigate, and what is the plan?  Military antiterrorism 
personnel can follow the same planning processes for antiterrorism program 
management. 
 
C. ASSET PRIORITIZATION MODEL (APM) 
CVAMP is a system that allows installation commanders to prioritize risk and 
compete for funding.  The next program falls under the DoD responsibility for the 
Defense Industrial Base and is described as an asset prioritization model.  It was 
developed by the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and provides a 
process for sector specific classification and subsequent prioritization of identified assets.  
Metrics are assigned to provide a “less subjective” means to categorize assets.  The DIB 
is unlike other CIP sectors as there are fewer tendencies to be networked together.  There 
are still many essential elements of the DIB that require a methodology to prioritize 
disparate critical infrastructure.  The Defense Department identifies and prioritizes DIB 
critical infrastructure by analyzing them and their impact on military mission 
achievement, where mission analysis is the key.61 
This Asset Prioritization Model (APM) is used for prioritization of DIB assets for 
both analysis and reduction of risk.  The APM is an index model where the higher the 
score, the higher the risk, with scores ranging from 12 to 151.  There are 13 distinct 
factors used to calculate the APM score that are classified into:  
• Mission Impact 
o Dependency/Independency Metric 
o Impact on Current Warfighting Metric (not in dictionary) 
o Impact on Projected Warfighting Capabilities Metric 
o Recovery Plan Metric 
• Political  
o Impact on Multiple Programs Metric,  
o Political and Secondary Effects Metric 
• Threat 
o Chemical/Biological/Radiological/Nuclear/Explosive (CBRNE) 
Collateral Damage Metric  
                                                 
61 Anti-terrorism/Force Protection Division, Defense Industrial Base. 
[https://www.noradnorthcom.mil/j3/j34] Accessed September 17, 2005.  
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o Population Metric 
o Threat Metric 
• Economic 
o The Financial Risk Metric 
o The Reconstitution Metric 
o Employment Impact Metric 
• Other 
o Vulnerability Assessment 
 
Table 1. AMP Current Warfighting Metric.62 
 
The purpose of the APM is to provide analysts with a quick means to prioritize 
DIB Critical Assets.  The results of rigorous assessments, such as the other VAs above, 
are used in producing each metric and sub-metric through further analyses.  The APM, 
along with JSIVA, could be used in other critical infrastructure sectors or sub-sectors like 
telecom hotels.                                                  
62 Anti-terrorism/Force Protection Division, Asset Prioritization Model.  
Impact on Current Warfighting Metric 
Number Factors 
1 A facility that produces no critical products for current 
missions. 
2 A facility that produces one or more critical products, all 
with a short lead-time (under 60 days), but inventories are above 
requirements. 
3 A facility that produces one or more critical products, with at 
least one long lead-time (above 60 days), and all inventories are at 
requirements. 
4 A facility that produces one or more critical products, with 
multiple long lead time items, single source for one or more 
products, and shortfalls in inventory. 
5 A facility that produces one or more critical products, with 
multiple long lead times, shortfalls inventory, sole source for one or 
more of those products, and a long surge requirement (30 days or 
more).   
Notes: Lack of data defaults to 2.  Critical products determined by 
DPO-MA and other sources.  Any item on a COCOM or DLA 
Warstopper list produced by a facility will likely place that facility at 
2 or 3 automatically. 
Data 
Source: 
DLA, Services, Combatant Commands, DPO-MA, DCMA 
IAC Surveys and Analysis 
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IV. FINDINGS 
A. WHAT TELECOM COMPANIES ARE DOING 
Through the course of this paper, several interviews were conducted, both in 
person and via telephone conversations.  The interviews were conducted with all major 
entities of telecom hotels and include representatives from Interexchange Carriers (IECs, 
Long-distance Carriers), Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs, former RBOCs), 
and Telecom Hotel Building Management Companies.  Most did not want to be identified 
by name nor disclose the actual companies they worked for, which could have 
compromised any vulnerabilities that they were aware of.  The position of the 
interviewees varied, but many were associated with the physical security of their 
organization.  The following is the result of those interviews.   
The first set of observations came from the IEC.  The personnel did not want to 
comment on who owned their building.  In many cases, the parent company initially 
owned the building, it was subsequently sold, and the buyers could not be named.  These 
spaces are now leased back from the new owners or a third party management company.  
This would make sense in a business perspective to keep the benefits of a neutral carrier 
hotel.  It is also possible that the ownership of the building was placed under a separate 
subsidiary or holding company for tax and liability reasons.  The company had assigned 
personnel to a federal group, which worked on the federal customers and coordinated 
with the Department of Homeland Security.  This company had colocation space in 
several of the large telecom hotels including the 111 Eighth and 60 Hudson locations in 
downtown New York City.  The biggest threats that the personnel saw came from cyber 
and IEDs.   
This company had not conducted vulnerability assessments on its locations, and 
background checks on personnel entering telecom hotels were up to the companies that 
they were working for.  This company did conduct background checks on its workers.  
Most of the telecom hotels did not have standoff distance, as many are located directly 
next to the roads surrounding them.  They did not have protection from chemical or 
biological attacks.  Several security improvements had been made since 9/11 due to 
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mandates, but the mandating authority could not be referenced.  The company’s main 
headquarters had stanchions put in to protect it from VBIEDs and  to provide a standoff  
distance.  Bulletproof glass was also installed in the headquarters, and security personnel 
were added.  Other improvements included a second Network Operations Center (NOC) 
installed in a geographically separated location, and a secondary data backup added for 
system and network configurations.  Most of the telecom hotels that they occupy had 
utilized biometrics in the form of palm readers and all had card access readers and 
security personnel on-site.  They mentioned that they had 50–60 gateway locations that 
would qualify as telecom hotels.  There were no additional funding sources or grants for 
any of the security improvements that had been made.  The interviewees would not 
disclose the number of fiber routes entering and exiting buildings, nor would they answer 
questions regarding what the effects would be if one of the telecom hotels were disclosed.  
They did talk about diverse power grids with both battery and generator back-up.  They 
also mentioned that there was equipment readily available in the event of a tragedy and 
vendors would place a priority in getting new equipment, as was done after 9/11.  Most 
security information they mentioned was proprietary, but they revealed that they had 
northern and southern, physically diverse, fiber routes.     
The next set of data came from ILEC interviews.  Again, much of the information 
was proprietary and could not be disclosed for publication.  The personnel were not able 
to comment on whether they owned the buildings or if the space was leased.  They also 
did not have any chem/bio protection, but did not think it was a threat.  HPM was not 
described as a threat due to the shielding as part of the infrastructure of the buildings.  
Even physical threats were not considered as a high priority because most terrorist attacks 
in the past have been to cause someone harm.  The centers house mainly equipment and 
there was a minimal threat to personnel.  Emergency equipment would be brought in and 
most services would be back up in three to four days.  Cyber protection was the number 
one priority due to the many locations under their purview.  This company had 11 data 
centers, 1,300 COs and over 30,000 other locations.  It was estimated to cost over one 
billion U.S. dollars to secure all of the facilities.  It could not be disclosed whether they 
had a backup NOC or the locations of either the primary or secondary NOCs.  They 
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mentioned that they conduct vulnerability assessments all of the time, but more based on 
physical security than homeland security.  The assessments are based on the following 
methodology: what is the threat, what is the risk, what is critical, and what is lost?  This 
is similar to what was discussed in Chapter III.  It was discovered that they are using 
NRIC best practices as their minimum standards on the telecom side.  They had to create 
their own IT side requirements.  For physical security measures, they had card access 
alarms, security access, disaster recovery and business continuity programs in addition to 
some data center unique requirements.  They did have a force protection type plan for 
their personnel, but it was more in reference to evacuation plans, fires, and natural 
disaster type events than one with a terrorism nexus.  The items described as security 
improvements were in disaster recovery, increased security personnel, headquarters 
fortification, a separate management network and secure sites. 
The last data set comes from management companies.  Most of the buildings were 
owned by capital companies and the personnel that were interviewed worked for 
operations management or property management companies.  They are in the business of 
colocation services and referred to it as “telecom real estate.”  They also conducted 
vulnerability assessments for the properties that they managed.  In addition, they manage 
the diversification of the routes, either for fiber or other traffic, the redundancy of their 
operations centers, and the redundancy of data warehouses.  They had multiple 
entry/exits for optical fiber routes.  One question that was not answered was whether they 
saw the detailed descriptions of the buildings and locations as a vulnerability. One 
interesting note from one of these groups was that they had recently been visited by the 
Department of Homeland Security and that they had been identified as an interest.  DHS 
conducted their research, but no results were relayed.  One company had a consulting 
firm―Daniel, Mann, Johnson, & Mendenhall (DMJM)―conduct an assessment of the 
facility.63  DMJM provides comprehensive planning, design services and consulting 
services as well as program management for architects, engineers, interior designers and 
planners.  Based primarily on the results of this assessment, bollards were installed 
around the exterior of the facility, and card readers for interior security.  Most of the 
                                                 
63 Candela Spillis, , DMJM, Inc. [http://www.scpmiami.com/Firmprofile.htm] Accessed September 
17, 2005. 
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modifications were implemented, but some were not.  Most of the interviewees described 
their facilities as well-protected and all had some form of vulnerability assessments 
conducted.  As you can see, the neutral telecom hotel property managers were the most 
proactive and forward about security measures.  Part of their marketing plan is to provide 
safe, secure space and facilities to their customers, and it was in their best interest to 
make these security improvements.    
The threat/mitigation matrix that follows summarizes what is being done by the 
IEC/ILEC and Telecom Hotel Management, respectively.  The threats in Table 2 are 
based on telecom hotels in particular and match the threats section in Chapter II.  The 
mitigation portion of this matrix is derived from the interviews with telecom company 
personnel. 
IEC / ILEC / 
THM
IEC / ILEC / 
THM
IEC / ILEC / 
THMPhysical-Personnel
IEC / ILEC / 
THM
IEC / ILEC / 
THMPhysical-CBR
IEC / ILEC / 
THM
IEC / ILEC / 
THM




IEC / ILEC / 
THMIEC / ILECPhysical-IED




IEC / ILEC / 
THMIEC / ILECPhysical-RF-HPM
















IEC / ILEC / 
THMIEC / ILECNatural-Maintenance Outage
IEC / 
ILEC
IEC / ILEC / 

















Table 2. Threat Prevention/Mitigation Matrix. 
 
IEC-Inter Exchange Carrier 
ILEC-Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier 
THM-Telecom Hotel Management 
IED-Improvised Explosive Device 
CBR-Chemical, Biological, Radiological Attack 
Emerg. Eq.-Emergency Equipment 
Gen/Bat BU-Generator/Battery Backup 
NOC/Data-Network Operations Center-Data warehouse Backup 
FW/Encrypt/VP-Firewall/Encryption/Virus protection 
Bckgrd Cks-Background Checks 
Access Card/Bio-Access Card Readers/Biometrics 
Bollards/Hard HQ-Bollards/Hardening Headquarters 
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B. WHO IS IN CHARGE? 
The last issue in defining the problem is determining who is in charge.  There are 
52 different organizations involved in CIP integration of commercial industry.  Some of 
the organizations are: the IAIP, the National Infrastructure Advisory Committee (NAIC), 
the President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee 
(NSTAC)64―30 industry CEOs dealing with CIP, information sharing, priority access, 
cyber security and crime, and network security (1982)―the President’s Information 
Technology Advisory Committee, the President’s CIP Board or Cyber Board, and the 
FCC.  It is simple to see that there are too many organizations involved to effectively 
implement a protection program.   
The National/Federal Agencies’ structure and response was immediate and bold 
after September 11, 2001.  The Administration created an Office of Cyberspace Security.  
The FBI created the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC).  The Office of 
Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council was established by Executive 
Order 13228, National Strategy for Homeland Security.  This document, published in 
July of 2002, completely restructured many of the agencies formerly involved in aspects 
of protecting the nation before it was defined as Homeland Security.  The plan also serves 
as the authority to move the NCS: “The Department of Homeland Security will work to 
develop comprehensive emergency communications systems. The National 
Communications System (NCS) would be incorporated into the Department of Homeland 
Security to facilitate the effort.”  A report out of the U.S. Army War College states that 
13 major departments and agencies are directly involved in the national 
telecommunications infrastructure.65  These include major departments such as the 
Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Commerce and Justice.  There are also 
several councils, committees and boards that are advisory in nature.    The same report 
also stated that there was strong evidence of duplication and overlapping responsibilities 
that were associated with the telecommunications sector. 
 
                                                 
64 NSTAC (National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee), “Network 
Security/Vulnerability Assessments Task Force Report,” (Washington, D.C.: NSTAC, 2002), 26.  
65 Baines, National Telecommunications, 25.   
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C. CIP INTER-DEPENDENCIES 
The initial guiding policy for CIP started well before the events of September 11, 
2001.  President William Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 63 “Critical 
Infrastructure Protection” in 1998.  PDD 63 states that the “United States will take all 
necessary measures to swiftly eliminate any significant vulnerability to both physical and 
cyber attacks on our critical infrastructures, including especially our cyber systems.”66  It 
also categorizes critical infrastructure into 12 different sectors and sets up a public-
private partnership to involve and coordinate with the private sector.  This task is a 
difficult one, as it is financially infeasible to build redundant systems to eliminate even a 
minimal amount of vulnerability in the telecom sector alone.   
Virtually every other infrastructure sector is dependent upon a secure and robust 
telecommunications infrastructure, either through telephones or the internet. One 
example of how the different sectors are linked is the telecommunications and the 
Railroads (RR) piece of the transportation sector.  Railroad companies are IT businesses 
and they know where every one of their trains and boxcars are located, what they are 
loaded with and where they are going.  If the IT systems went down due to 
communications failures, the trains would stop.  It is interesting to note that the telecom 
sector is related to the RR network in other ways as well.  The right of way of many RR 
lines contains the majority of the nation’s fiber optic network.  Oil lines also co-exist with 
fiber optic routes, so here is the first interdependency with the energy sector, which 
represent two birds with one stone if you are a terrorist.   Both GAO and the 9/11 
commission reported critical infrastructure interdependencies that were not discovered 
until after the tragic events of that day.  Due to these interdependencies among all critical 
infrastructures, an attack on one could result in cascading effects across many others.  For 
this reason, not only critical assets must be identified, but also what other sectors are 
connected and what the effects of a failure would be.  The president’s commission on CIP 
described the following as being interdependent on telecommunications infrastructure:  
banking and financial systems, power, energy, transportation, water, medical and 
healthcare, emergency services and government operations.  Another study named the 
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following as highly dependent on telecommunications:  finance, defense, emergency 
services and transportation.  Another category for interdependency in the report was the 
vulnerable sectors that heavily rely on telecom:  water, sewage, power, transportation, 
finance, defense, and emergency services.67 
  
D. DOD TELECOMMUNICATIONS CASE STUDY 
The structure of the DoD is very complex but well ordered; it serves as a good 
model.  General Ralph Eberhardt, at the time commander of USSPACECOM, testified 
before the U.S. Senate Armed Service Committee Strategic Subcommittee on Computer 
Network Defense (CND) and Computer Network Attack (CNA). “There is a real and 
growing threat to Department of Defense unclassified computer systems and networks. It 
is no secret that the U.S. military’s operational capability depends on information 
superiority―our ability to make smarter, faster decisions.  This is both a tremendous 
advantage and a potential vulnerability.”68 
How does the DoD manage responsibility?  The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 
provide oversight into the communications programs.69  Defense Information Systems 
Agency (DISA) was responsible for management and implementation of the National 
Communications System (NCS).  The National Security Agency (NSA) is responsible for 
protecting national security telecommunications and information systems.  The Defense 
Advance Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is responsible for the R&D of protecting 
critical infrastructure.70  The policy behind this structure is due to the FY 1997 Defense 
Authorization Act, in which the president assigned USCINCSPACE the responsibility to 
lead the Computer Network Defense (CND) mission for the Department of Defense.  
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This now belongs to USSTRATCOM―U.S. Strategic Command in Omaha, NE.  A 
subordinate command of USSTRATCOM that is tactically responsible for this mission is 
Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO).  JTF-GNO is responsible for 
coordinating and directing activities related to computer attack.   
The Department of Defense portrays an image of protection, security, and 
confidence when imagining its bases and infrastructure, patrolled by armed guards and 
with concertina wire fencing around its perimeter.  There is no doubt that the U.S. 
military is a most formidable opponent and will use all the strength it has to protect its 
personnel, but what about its telecommunications networks?  Does this same logic hold 
true for Department of Defense computer systems networks and telecommunications 
networks?  The military tends to devote an enormous amount of resources to protecting 
these networks, but can terrorists pierce this armored coating through the civilian sector?  
How vulnerable is the military to cyber or physical attacks that could conceivably cripple 
its command and control structure?   
The Department of Defense (DoD) currently operates two to three million 
computers, 100,000 local area networks, and 100 long distance networks to include the 
systems required for the Command and Control (C2) of forces.  These systems support 
distributed collaborative planning for crises and contingencies and manage logistics and 
supplies, as well as distributing sensitive intelligence in real time.71  The main entity that 
runs the department’s networks is the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA).  
The mission statement from their web page says:  
The Defense Information Systems Agency is a combat support agency 
responsible for planning, engineering, acquiring, fielding, and supporting 
global net-centric solutions to serve the needs of the President, Vice 
President, the Secretary of Defense, and other DoD Components, under all 
conditions of peace and war. 
DISA provides services through systems that are interoperable, security assured, 
survivable, available and of superior quality.  The specific services provided are globally 
classified and unclassified voice, data, video, and transport services through a 
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combination of terrestrial and satellite assets.72  The majority of the assets are 
commercially acquired and complemented with military value-added features.  Also 
included are military satellites and a small portion of military terrestrial infrastructure, 
Outside the Continental United States (OUTCONUS).  The value-added by the military is 
the aspect that separates the DoD system from a commercial system by adding features 
like robust encryption, personal and physical security, diversity of route and media, and 
controllable assets. This is critical to insuring that U.S. forces maintain superiority in 
information warfare.   
DISA began in Washington, D.C., as the Defense Communications Agency 
(DCA) in May of 1960, with 450 employees.  Its mission then was to manage the 
Defense Communications System (DCS), which was a consolidation of the independent 
long-haul communications networks of the Army, Navy and Air Force.73  Later, in the 
1960s, DCA moved to Arlington, Virginia, and picked up several other major 
organizations to include what is now known as the White House Communications 
Agency.  Through the 1970s and 1980s the agency continued to grow until June 1991, 
when DCA was renamed DISA to reflect the larger role of providing a total information 
systems management package to DoD.  To indicate the size and emphasis DoD places on 
its information systems networks, this agency alone employs approximately 8,000 
personnel.  This does not include the IT and telecommunications professionals in each of 
the military services that add to the communications mission. 
DISA runs the Defense Information System Network (DISN), which provides 
both data services and voice communications.  There are many sub-elements to the DISN 
network.  Data services such as secure Internet Protocol (IP) and Asynchronous Transfer 
Mode (ATM) data communications services are provided via the NIPRNet and 
SIPRNet.74  The NIPRNet or Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network provides 
seamless interoperability for unclassified combat support applications and controlled 
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access to the internet.  The data rates range from 56 Kbps (Kilobits per second or 
thousands of bits per second) to 155 Mbps (Megabits per second or millions of bits per 
second).  The SIPRNet, on the other hand, is the Secret IP Router Network and is the 
DoD’s largest interoperable command and control data network.75  The SIPRNet also 
supports the Global Command and Control System (GCCS, pronounced “geeks”), the 
Defense Message System (DMS), and many other classified warfighter applications. The 
SIPRNet runs at a data rate of up to 45 Mbps. 
Besides the primary tasks, DISA runs other essential services.   Enhanced Mobile 
Satellite Services (EMSS) is a Personal Communications System (PCS) providing secure 
and non-secure voice and data services utilizing commercial satellites.  DISN Video 
Services provide for Video Teleconferencing (VTC) and Secure Video Teleconferencing 
(SVTC―pronounced “civits”) up to a top-secret classification.  DISA also provides 
computer processing, utilizing over 1,400 applications with more than 55 mainframe 
computers and 1,350 servers.76  DISA also plays the major role of protecting, monitoring, 
analyzing, detecting, and responding to unauthorized activity of the networks through 
Computer Network Defense (CND).  DoD is currently implementing the Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) for cryptographic security services for the networks.  Lastly, there is 
another method by which DISA is keeping networks secure:  There was an 
announcement last year that DISA was signing up to a three-year agreement with 
Symantec to provide early signs of attacks on its networks.77 Is this a good thing, or just 
another way of the military outsourcing the critical functions of securing its networks?   
While DISA is responsible for the Engineering, Furnishing and Installation 
(EF&I) of the DISN, another agency is responsible for the 24/7 operations of the Defense 
Information Systems Network.  This agency, which is heavily involved in monitoring the 
DoD Global Information Grid (GIG), formerly known as the Defense Information 
Infrastructure, is Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO).  The mission 
of JTF-GNO is:  
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Subject to the authority and direction of the Commander, U.S. Strategic 
Command (CDR USSTRATCOM), the Joint Task Force - Global 
Network Operations (JTF-GNO), in conjunction with Department of 
Defense (DoD) Combatant Commands, Services and Agencies (CC/S/A), 
operates and defends the Global Information Grid (GIG), ensuring that our 
nation's warfighting forces get the right information at the right place at 
the right time with appropriate protection of that information.78 
In December 1998, Joint Task Force-Computer Network Defense was created 
and, in 1999, was assigned to the United States Space Command (USSPACECOM).  It 
was later renamed Joint Task Force-Computer Network Operations (JTF-CNO) and, in 
2002, was placed under United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).  Since June 
2004, the Director of DISA is the Commander, JTF-GNO and also Deputy Commander 
for Global Network Operations and Defense, USSTRATCOM Joint Forces 
Headquarters—Information Operations (JFHQ-IO).79  The director of DISA, Lieutenant 
General Harry D. Raduege, Jr., USAF, is in charge of basically all “information” in the 
DoD arena.  The Global NetOps Center (GNC) of JTF-GNO is the product of a merger of 
the Operations Directorate, DISA's Global Network Operations and Security Center 
(GNOSC), the DoD Computer Emergency Response Team (DoD-CERT), and the Global 
SATCOM Support Center.80  The GNC is responsible for the daily activities associated 
with policy, defense of the GIG, information assurance, information management, and 
satisfying strategic information priorities.  JTF-GNO is a much smaller organization, 
consisting of only 255 personnel.   
An ever-increasing concern is the challenge of civilian dependency.  An inherent 
problem with the DoD’s Defense Information Systems Network is that once the traffic 
(multimedia-data, voice, video) leaves the base or federal installation, it rides on 
commercially leased telephone lines called the Public Switched Telecommunications 
Network (PSTN).  The majority of the two billion miles of optical fiber runs along the 
rights-of-way of railroad companies or along utility or oil/gas rights-of-way.  DoD is 
increasingly reliant on the civilian infrastructure, which in turn increases its vulnerability.   
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A terrorist or an adversary could identify and attack critical nodes, and that could 
severely degrade the network, exposing a potential vulnerability based on this 
dependence.  Another issue in many of the CIP fields, but especially in the telecom 
sector, is that the infrastructure is privately owned.  Private sector infrastructure, in many 
cases, directly supports military operations (with communications, logistics, etc.)  These 
private sector systems come with many benefits as well as problems, and are increasingly 
being incorporated into military systems.  To amplify the dependence of the military on 
civilian infrastructure, during Operation Desert Storm over 90% of inter-theater 
communications utilized commercial satellites.81 
Another source of weakness is DoD’s increasing emphasis on Commercial, Off-
The-Shelf (COTS) systems and software.  For purposes of standardization and 
economics, it is better to use available COTS systems. The problem is that as 
vulnerabilities are identified in a COTS system, they can be exploited to attack all the 
users of that same system.  Software companies warn users of vulnerabilities in their 
programs to avoid lawsuits and bad press.  This also serves as notification for hackers to 
exploit this vulnerability, and many accomplish this before company programmers are 
able to implement a “bug” fix. 
A new way that terrorists may attempt to attack a network is through employment 
in the civilian sector; with increasing reliance on outsourcing, this method may be 
possible.  While companies have security background checks for employees, they may 
not be sufficient to catch a well-trained terrorist.  A web page ad for General Dynamics 
Network Systems lists the IT solutions it provides for voice, video and data for the Navy-
Marine Corps team.  It goes on to say  
We are the leader in modernizing the Navy-Marine Corps' voice switches 
and telecommunications systems. We are the largest DoD distributor of 
Nortel Networks Telephone Switching Systems.82   General Dynamics and 
its subcontractors are modernizing the Department of Defense Command, 
Control, Communications-Computer, and Intelligence (C4I) infrastructure, 
by obtaining state-of-the-art distribution systems.  Our technical support 
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service capabilities include advanced engineering, management and 
support services to the Officer of Naval Intelligence, Commander Naval 
Security Group and other Department of Defense customers.   
This is very alarming, because it is not only General Dynamic’s employees, but 
also its subcontractors that have access to the military and its equipment.  Even more 
alarming is that this company is furnishing and installing DoD’s critical components of 
its C4I to customers like the Office of Naval Intelligence.  Another report said that an 
official from the U.S. Navy’s telecommunications systems IT operations thinks his 
branch needs to do a better job of ensuring that outsourced contractor software is 
secure.83  Again, another vulnerability is discovered as DoD continues to outsource 
network solutions; and terrorist insiders in a company could gain access to critical 
networks or render them useless through software bugs and viruses.   
One more example of outsourcing critical functions is from a Marconi press 
release announcing 10 Gbps encryption for surveillance data to be used on military 
intelligence assets such as the Global Hawk and Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAVs).84  Again, does this add value to the security efforts within DoD, or does it allow 
more vulnerabilities by utilizing another company that is not U.S.-owned?  The list goes 
on, from a Canadian Company called Wescam that provides intelligence, surveillance 
and reconnaissance, and communications to DoD and all of the U.S. military services, to 
a company called Techsoft that provides out-sourced E-commerce solutions to DoD 
agencies.85 
The Navy is taking positive steps to reduce vulnerabilities that were initially 
discovered during the Y2K (Year 2000) crisis.  Every mission function in the Navy is tied 
to Information Technology (IT).  Another discovery is that the Navy relies on the private 
sector, state, and local governments for telecommunications, in addition to public utilities 
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and road systems.86  One of the steps in reducing the Navy’s vulnerabilities is the 
creation of a process called the Naval Integrated Vulnerability Assessment Process.  This 
process takes a look at the physical security of U.S. infrastructures, Anti-Terrorism/Force 
Protection (AT/FP) issues, Computer Network Defense (CND), and commercial 
dependencies on telecommunications and public utilities.87  One other area that has heavy 
civilian influence is the new Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI).  EDS has now taken 
responsibility for the majority of the new enterprise network for all members of the Naval 
Service.  This contract leads to a new vulnerability, which is the economic trouble within 
the telecom sector.  Many telecom companies started having economic difficulty prior to 
the events of 9/11.  On the edge of financial health was Worldcom, as the company had 
been in Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing for several years.88 At the time, Worldcom filed the 
largest corporate bankruptcy filing in history, and they are also the major telecom 
provider for NMCI.  The Navy is focusing even more on being connected through the 
internet for services like tele-maintenance, tele-medicine, and distance-learning with the  
new Navy Knowledge On-line (NKO).  As Americans make themselves more connected 
through the internet, they also become more vulnerable if an attack on these systems is 
successful.   
A different measure of security comes from an organization called Joint Program 
Office for Special Technology Countermeasures (JPO-STC), which has been identifying 
DoD’s mission-essential infrastructure since 1990.  The Department of Defense relies 
heavily on commercial and defense infrastructure to support its missions and operations. 
An Infrastructure Assurance Program (IAP) has been established to provide DoD 
decision-makers, Geographical Combatant Commanders (GCCs), and operational 
commanders with the analysis and assessment capability to identify susceptibilities in 
critical infrastructure and operational dependencies that, if not assured, could adversely 
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impact mission accomplishment and military operations vital to national security.89  One 
of the vulnerabilities that JPO-STC has discovered is the Programmable Logic 
Controllers (PLCs) that reside in Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
systems.  These PLCs control utilities that the military requires to accomplish its mission 
and they are also used in controlling U.S. Navy Warships.  This is a vulnerability that 
falls under the cyber realm and one where zero tolerance to any form of attack must be 
maintained. 
Another method by which DoD maintains a secure network is through its use of 
DoD directives and instructions.  The Secretary of Defense can issue a directive for all 
members of the DoD.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) also has the 
authority to issue DoD-wide guidance through CJCS Instructions.  One such directive is 
DoD Directive 4640.7, which is titled “DoD Telecommunications System (DTS) in the 
National Capital Region (NCR).”90  It states that anyone acquiring, managing, or 
operating telecommunications in the NCR is required to follow certain processes and 
procedures in compliance with this and other associated directives.  Another DoD 
Directive, 5100.41, titled “Executive Agent Responsibilities for the National 
Communications System (NCS),” listed the duties of members of the DoD for which they 
were responsible with respect to the NCS.91  This overall responsibility was moved to the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in March 2003.92  A third directive is DoD 
Directive 4640.13, Management of Base and Long-Haul Telecommunications Equipment 
and Services.  This directive establishes policy and assigns responsibility for the use of 
base and long-haul telecom equipment and services.93  The last and possibly most 
important of the sampling of directives and instructions is Joint Publication 6.0.  This 
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publication establishes Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer 
(C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations.  In 88 short pages, this document covers the 
following aspects of C4 systems: the role, objectives, components, principles, 
responsibilities, and standardization.94 
The Army has also implemented measures to protect its networks.  A 
vulnerability that the Army Signal Command discovered was an attack on the Domain 
Name Servers (DNS) within the Army.  DNS serves to translate numbers like 
140.183.234.10 into a World Wide Web (WWW) address like www.army.mil.  This 
command ran a mission to counter an attack on military networks called “Solar 
Sunrise.”95  The Army continued working on this vulnerability issue along with many 
other IT issues to minimize any effects of an attack on its systems.   
To see how the U.S. Air Force (USAF) is implementing information security, you 
can observe how they are structured.  The 68th Information Operations Squadron is 
located at Brooks City-Base, Texas.  This organization provides personnel to identify 
deficiencies in USAF telecommunications and computer security programs.96  Their  
mission is to conduct Command, Control, Communications and Computer (C4) security 
assessments.  They observe, analyze and make recommendations to reduce telecom 
vulnerabilities.   
In summary, the information revolution has changed all aspects of Americans’ 
lives, and this is especially true in the DoD.  The advantage that the U.S. military gains 
from information technology has a negative effect that makes it dependent on computers 
and networks.  A second dependency, on the civilian/private industry telecom 
infrastructure, adds greatly to this vulnerability.  Fortunately, the Department of Defense 
has one master organization, the Defense Information Systems Agency, which provides 
strategic direction for the overarching network, the Defense Information System 
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Network, which encompasses the majority of DoD voice and data traffic.  This agency 
has thousands of personnel to monitor and provide support to JTF-GNO, which is the 
task force responsible for network operations.   
The secretary of defense, along with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
issues directives and guidance to delegate responsibility and ensure that standards are 
met.  In addition, each of the military services has its own personnel to ensure 
information assurance and network security.  Military networks are vulnerable to a 
variety of attacks from a number of actors due to the interaction with private industry, but 
this vulnerability has been minimized through the efforts of DISA and the military value-
added telecom technologies.  DoD networks are among the most secure, due to 
encryption and secure, diverse routed networks, but the weakest link in the chain is the 
majority of privately owned networks that make up the civilian telecom infrastructure.  
Military command and control communications have many redundant and back-up 
systems built in, to ensure that orders from the chain-of-command get to the soldiers in 
the field.  DISA is up to the task of keeping a technological information advantage over 

































Figure 14.   Vulnerabilities of DoD Communications Sector Fault Tree 
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Figure 14 is a portrayal of the entire communications sector for DoD, including 
both telecom and IT.  It was designed based on the case study to emphasize the 
interdependencies with the civilian sector as described above.  What cannot be depicted is 
the dependency of cellular and extra-terrestrial systems on terrestrial land lines. The IT 
infrastructure is very dependent on the DoD owned assets that are run by civilian vendors 
(e.g., Navy-Marine Corps, the Telecommunications Infrastructure).  There are too many 
variables and unknowns to show these dependencies in the illustration.  This really shows 
that while the majority of DoD owned systems are physically secure, have diversity of 
routes, and have robust cyber protection, there is a major dependency on civilian owned 
infrastructure.  Even some internet (NMCI) is run by EDS.  An additional vulnerability 
comes from large scale EMP, which would make all non-hardened circuits inoperable.  
All of the vulnerabilities of fiber, IED and Cyber are contained within the various 
infrastructures.  There is redundancy built in to the commercial satellite phone services, 
as many companies own their own satellites, such as Iridium, INMARSAT, Globalstar, 
and Thuraya.  Many of these signals, however, feed into the same land earth stations.  
DoD is very dependent on all of these civilian systems, as demonstrated by Hurricane 
Katrina.  Only satellite based communications were initially operable. 
 
E. TELCO INITIATIVES 
Telecommunications companies are delivering several initiatives.  .  The first is 
from Verizon and deals directly with homeland security issues such as disaster recovery, 
contingency planning, and network security.97  To the skeptic, these are probably the 
same services that they offered years ago for high QoS-level customers for natural 
disasters, but now are under a new name.  Services offered include: security testing and 
assessments, security policy planning, firewall design, technology planning for security, 
intrusion detection services, and virus detection.  The Verizon division that markets this  
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is Business Recovery and Continuity Services (BRCS), which is an outsourced 
organization to help run the network.  They will help protect, restore, and recover the 
client’s network. 
AT&T also offers Homeland Security related services.  AT&T Government 
Solutions covers Government Continuity of Operations (COOP).98  They offer diversely 
routed networks, backup wireless solutions, alternate call routing, mirrored data backup, 
and network monitoring.  These services have always existed, but normally have an 
exorbitant cost associated with them.  Small ISPs would not consider these types of 
services, but 911 and emergency services or high levels of federal government entities 
have had them for years. 
The last initiative is from 365 Main, a telecom hotel, which passed the Statement 
of Auditing Standards No. 70 representing service organizations that have been through 
an in-depth audit of their control activities, including controls over information 
technology and related processes.99  This was in addition to the already completed ISO 
9000:2000.  These are difficult standards to attain and show a dedication, as service 
providers, to maintain the highest levels of auditing control over their internal processes.  
To show the reliance expected in the telecom industry, or so the company’s press release 
claimed, 365 Main is the only data center to continuously exceed the industry standard of 
99.999% uptime since its inception.   
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. CONCLUSION 
In summary, action must be taken in order to ensure both prevention of cyber -
terrorism and protection of CIP.  This research discovered that terrorists have the 
capability and desire to commit attacks against the telecom industry.  The structure and 
strategy required to reduce vulnerabilities and to deny and defeat the enemy need a 
considerable amount of work.  Prevention and protection are needed through many 
agencies, departments, localities, and especially industry/private sector, but there has not 
been one coordinated effort.  The U.S. is still vulnerable to attack.  Many new programs 
have been started as a result of 9/11, but a guiding light is needed.   This thesis offers a 
few alternatives for what needs to be done.  There are a lot of gray areas that need to be 
defined in order to protect the nation from, and prevent, a telecommunications 9/11.  
It is ironic, but 911 emergency systems are on the same circuits and lines and just 
as vulnerable as other components listed above.  A carefully planned and successful 
telecom terrorist attack would severely degrade the nation’s ability to recover.  If terrorist 
organizations can teach their members to fly aircraft, it would be expected that they could 
also teach their members to work on telecom equipment and gain access to these already 
vulnerable locations.  For this reason, a “watch list” type of screening needs to be 
implemented for employees that access critical telecom areas.  On initial review, this may 
seem far-fetched or extreme, but the precedent has already been made with the TSA’s 
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program.  This program 
conducts background checks on transportation workers at the port and issues ID cards for 
those workers.  Another program, US-VISIT, requires visitors to the U.S. applying for a 
visa to go through a program that checks biographical information and biometric data of 
the visitor against watch lists. 
The initiatives mentioned, along with initiatives already implemented, will be 
effective in reducing vulnerabilities in the telecommunications infrastructure, but they 
will take time.  Patience will be key in the Global War on Terrorism and the Department 
of Homeland Security must be given time to effect a change.  
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B. RECOMMENDATION 
1. Strategic Budgeting 
A comprehensive strategic planning and budgeting process needs to be considered 
by all owners of critical telecommunications facilities.  Most “for-profit” companies have 
previously accomplished some form of strategic planning and budgeting for their 
organizations.  Budgeting functions take place annually, but the strategic planning 
process is usually less frequent, and strategic plans need to be re-evaluated in this new 
HLS environment.  For telecommunications companies, there are certain minimum HLS 
measures that need to be taken into account: 
• Physical security improvements to account for IEDs (Improvised Explosive 
Devices) 
• CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield Explosive) 
detection 
• Cyber security controls 
• Redundant NOCs (Network Operations Centers)/data warehouses 
• Biometric security measures for internal workers, and access control systems 
Because there are no currently mandated requirements for companies to improve 
their HLS measures, there needs to be a tie-in to HLS measures like the NIPP (National 
Infrastructure Protection Program).  As previous strategic planning was based on core 
competencies related to ROI and profit; they didn’t include costs associated with HLS 
security measures.  Even though HLS security measures are not a core competency, they 
are an essential cost center, like HR or recruiting.  It is a necessity for private companies 
to improve the measures as suggested above to maintain a standard in the protection of 
workers, U.S. citizens, and the economy.   An additional possibility is to again use the 
DoD model for identifying vulnerabilities and providing for a method of sourcing 
shortfalls or unfunded requirements.  A separate line in the federal budget would provide 
for emergent vulnerabilities that are short-term or based on new threat information or 
new terrorist modus operandi.  Long-term budgeting should be handled through the 
organizations’ strategic budgeting processes. 
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2. Mandates 
The most effective policies and strategies start from the top and work down.   For 
this reason, Congress needs to construct and pass into law a bill that will give the 
Department of Homeland Security authority to set standards for CIP, above and beyond 
what is directed in HSPD-7.  The Homeland Security Council Deputies Committee 
(HSC-DC) should provide the oversight required for this program.  It has already been 
established that the agency under DHS that is responsible for providing specific 
coordination and policy direction on a daily basis is Information Analysis and 
Infrastructure Protection (IAIP).  IAIP needs to receive the executive power to enforce 
standards for building codes and protection systems.  DHS has also been tasked to 
maintain the National Communication System.  In addition, DHS is the sector-specific 
agency for the telecommunications sector.  It also has control of the ISAC through NCC.  
NCS, under the Department of Homeland Security, needs to take the lead role in 
establishing policy for the telecommunications infrastructure sector.  This will include 
setting the baseline standard for conduct of vulnerability assessments based on combined 
methodologies like MBVA and JSIVA.  NTIA should be in an advisory role only for the 
executive branch, and overlapping HLS roles should be removed from its charter.  NRIC 
has been extremely successful with its best practices; it should be DHS’s responsibility to 
examine these and determine which ones should become mandates.  DHS would be 
responsible for inspecting companies to ensure that they are in compliance with those 
standards, the way the Transportation Security Agency (TSA) takes responsibility for 
ensuring safe air travel through inspection of passengers and luggage.   
3. Overall 
What must be done? The answer is simple: security and protection measures must 
be increased and implemented at all areas of vulnerability previously listed.  The 
execution is difficult, as the cost to secure the hardware and fiber would easily run into 
the billions.  There are redundant systems that have been put into place for natural types 
of disasters, but nothing that will remain in place after a holocaust type of catastrophic 
event.  Another problem of vulnerability is that telecommunications systems have been 
designed to be run out of an NOC, or Network Operations Center.  This allows 
maintenance and upgrades to be performed from one central site, rather than having to 
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physically deploy maintenance personnel to perform these functions, which is a very 
costly endeavor. This also means that it is feasible for people to hack into that same 
network. 
The structure and strategy to defend these networks must be determined.  The 
structure and strategy to protect from terrorism is not clear, but it is necessary to 
understand what has been done so far to protect the nation’s telecommunications CIP and 
essential communications networks.  There must be continued emphasis on redundancy 
and diversity within the telecommunications infrastructure.  The U.S. must continue to 
move away from single points of failure, as is being done with the additional MAEs and 
NAPs being added to the networks.  All levels of government have a role to play, 
including an increased level of coordination and increased responsiveness by private 
industry as the primary owners of the infrastructure. 
Individual commitment to a group effort―that is what makes a team 
work, a company work, a society work, a civilization work.  
 —Vince Lombardi   
 
C. CHALLENGES AHEAD 
Integration of commercial industry (private sector) with federal agencies is clearly 
one of the most significant challenges facing the task of protecting critical infrastructure 
and, specifically, the national telecommunications networks.  As stated previously, 
roughly 95% of the national telecommunications infrastructure traverses through 
commercial networks. Another challenge is the lack of a federal mandate for the private 
sector to reduce vulnerabilities.  Many times, the telecom companies own the optical 
fiber or the communications hardware, but they do not own the right-of-way or the 
buildings that house the equipment.  This leaves less incentive for any parties to spend 
large amounts of money on someone else’s interests.  A final challenge is the problem of 
certification and standardization, as there are too many standards boards involved: ATIS 
(Alliance for telecom industry standards), ITU (International Telecom Union), and ANSI 
(American National Standards Institute).  There are different perspectives between 
stakeholders on what constitutes a secure and reliable network.  Standards must be 
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developed based on roles within the telecommunications sector.  The NRIC best practices 
list is a good example of how to implement this strategy.     
It is the opinion of this author that the telecommunications infrastructure sector, 
including telecom hotels, is safe and secure at this time and free from the existence of any 
significant new threats.  This is not due to homeland security initiatives or 
recommendations, but rather from competition in the market place, redundancy, and 
diverse routing due to expected high levels of service.  The PSTN was built to withstand 
many natural disasters, including floods, hurricanes, tornados, and earthquakes.  Building 
owners and managers rely on survivable facilities, and they guarantee these services as 
part of their contracts.  Equipment manufacturers are under the same guidelines, as the 
equipment is built to be survivable and under strict specifications.  Service providers also 
want to provide a high quality of service to their customers, and when all is factored in, 
this is what makes a robust and redundant telecommunications and IT network.  The 
cyber threat is probably the most damaging and feasible threat to the sector.  A cyber 
threat can attack all buildings and networks and systems almost instantaneously, where 
even a simultaneous attack on several telecom hotels would only result in local or, at 
best, regional outage, and only for a limited amount of time. 
Based on information provided by the interviewees, and aligned with other 
resource material, there would seem to be no single point of failure.  Some small local 
failures may occur, but only on the edge of the telecommunications infrastructure.  As 
you get closer to the core, or the backbone of either the PSTN or the internet, the 
redundancy increases.  Ring architecture, geographically diverse routing and other 
technological advances have accounted for the robust nature of the system due to the 
diversity of providers.  Service redundancy and Quality of Service (QoS) have also 
helped to make reliable networks.  Two sectors combined, telecom and IT, have also 
helped with making a reliable network.  Even though convergence and the marketplace 
have brought these two sides together, they continue to have different redundancy 
methods built in, to further protect the survivability of the networks.  The conclusion of a 
study on information and telecommunications stated that the sector was resilient, robust 
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and redundant and would recover quickly in the likelihood of a small attack.100  A well 
timed attack on specific assets could cause both economic and psychological destruction.  
The effects of such an attack could be excessive as other sectors would also be affected.  
It would take extensive preparation, ability and resources to pull off such an attack.  A 
final thought: despite the reassurances of the telecommunications companies and 
operators, there must continue to be an in-depth look for vulnerabilities that may not be 
noticed on the surface. 
 
Figure 15.   NYC Metro Fiber Network.101 
 
                                                 
100 IRIA Group, Institute for Security, 2002, 3. 
101 Progress Telecom LLC. [http://www.epik.net/pdf/Tier%201%20(300dpi)V13.pdf] Accessed 
September 17, 2005. 
  71 
Richard Clarke, Special Advisor to the President for Cyberspace Security, in 
remarks made before the business session of the President’s National Security 
Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) on March 13, 2002, shows the 
significance of telecom hotel vulnerabilities:  
I'm told, for example, that although TransAtlantic Fiber lands at about 10 
different places in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Long Island and New 
Jersey that, after having landed, it all goes to one of two facilities -- 60 
Hudson Street or 111 Eighth Avenue in Lower Manhattan. If that's true, 
that would seem to be a problem. 
And what is the role of Government in the burden sharing, the cost sharing 
of increasing the diversification of routing? But I suspect this statement, 
which I am told is true, is true, that if you blew up 60 Hudson Street and 
111 Eighth Avenue, we could not communicate via fiber optic with 
Europe. 102 
                                                 
102 Lack and Ferrari, “Critical Infrastructure Protection,” 4.  
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APPENDIX 
A. TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORK OVERVIEW 
Telecom 101: Telecom is short for telecommunications.  Wikipedia defines 
telecommunication as “the extension of communication over a distance. In practice it also 
recognizes that something may be lost in the process; hence the term telecommunication 
covers all forms of distance and/or conversion of the original communications, including 
radio, telegraphy, television, telephony, data communication and computer networking.” 
103  Webster’s defines it as communication at a distance (as by telephone).  This process 
starts with a telephone in the home.  A call is dialed and the signal is directed, through 
switching equipment, to the person who was called.  The signal initially rides on a Plain 
Old Telephone Service (POTS) line, where it enters the local loop.  From this “headend” 
the signal passes to a Local Exchange Carrier  (LEC) end office and then to a central 
office.  If this is a long distance call, the call is routed to a Point of Presence (POP) at a 
Inter-Exchange Carrier (IEC), which is a long-distance company such as AT&T or MCI.  
The call rides along that carrier’s network until it arrives at the city of the recipient of the 
call.  Along the way, the signal is placed onto bigger “pipes” through a process called 
multi-plexing.  There is an economy of scale in allowing this call to travel with other 
calls, or even internet data.  The signal normally starts as an analog call, is transferred to 
digital, and then to optical as it rides on optical fiber; the process is reversed at the other 
end.  Once it transforms to a digital signal, it looks similar to data on a computer, which 
is a series of 1 and O characters.  
Many pieces of hardware originate at the home office or RBOC (Regional Bell 
Operating Center); some of these are the PC, Ethernet, Hub, router, switch, ADM 
(add/drop multiplexer), and fiber optic DWDM (Dense Wave-Division Multiplexer). A 
DWDM takes different frequency wavelengths and amplifies several optical signals on 
one fiber optic line.  Terabits of information can be passed through these networks.  To 
connect to the Internet, one may use dial-up, cable modem, or ISDN (Integrated Services 
                                                 
103 Wikipedia Encyclopedia. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telecommunication] Accessed September 
17, 2005. 
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Digital Network).  Dial-up is at a rate of 28.8 to 36.6 Kbps, or 28,800 to 36,600 bits per 
second.  The Photonic optical network can work at speeds currently up to 1.76 terabits of 
information per second.  A terabit is one trillion bits of data.  This is also equivalent to 
320 OC-192’s (Optical Carrier signal) or 10 Gigabits.104  Ten Gbps is the equivalent of 
129,000 voice conversations.  So, there are 41,280,000 voice conversations on one fiber 
optic line, and this is all done with DWDM.  Everyone is familiar with WMD (Weapons 
of Mass Destruction), but WDM or DWDM (Wave Division or Dense Wave-Division 
Multiplexing) is splitting the frequencies or colors of light and then combining them onto 
one single fiber.  This illustrates the immense volume of bandwidth that is as risk, 
through millions of phone calls or data transfers or transactions. 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 created open competition and caused the 
PSTN and Internet to become more and more connected, software driven, and remotely 
managed.  Previous sections of this thesis demonstrated how this has increased 
vulnerabilities in the sector.  The telecom and Information Technology (IT) assets are 
becoming increasingly concentrated into these large shared facilities.  This issue is 
compounded in today’s global world of IT, and a rash of industry mergers, due to 
Convergence.  If you were to diagram telecommunications and computer networks across 
the U.S., they would look like one is overlaid onto the other.  This network may also 
overlay and is interdependent on oil lines and railroads, because much of the fiber in the 
ground runs along the right-of-way of these two industries.  As the technology in the IT 
and telecom fields increases, so do the vulnerabilities, as the two industries cross-
pollinate.105  All traditional telephony and internet traffic passes through the same 
physical places.  This also includes wireless traffic from a Wi-Fi hotspot using the 802.11 
standard cellular phone traffic that passes from the cell towers into the PSTN (Public 
Switched Telephone Network).  Even satellite communications and data pass from the 
satellite down to a LES (Land Earth Station) and then get routed over the PSTN.  This 
convergence is the cause of the first major significant vulnerability in the systems.  
                                                 
104 Gerald R. Hust, Major, “Taking Down Telecommunications,” Thesis, Maxwell AFB, AL, School 
of Advanced Airpower Studies, May 28, 1993. 
105 Warren G. Reed, Director, Information Management and Technology Division, Testimony before 
the House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Transportation, Aviation, and Materials Committee on 
Science & Technology, October 17, 1983 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GAO, 1983). 
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Convergence is the combining of data, voice, video, internet traffic, wireless, and 
landline (wireline).106  Your banking information, credit card/ATM (automated teller 
machine) transactions, email, video for cable television, voice communications, 
conference calls, VTCs (Video Teleconferences), and IPTV (Internet Protocol 
TeleVision) all ride on fiber optic cables throughout the United States and across the 
globe. 
Several types of critical nodes contain this convergence of media: international 
gateways like New York and San Francisco, telco hotels in the major cities, NAP 
(Network Access Points), where all internet traffic merges—formerly in New York, 
Washington D.C., Chicago, and San Francisco.  The merger of computers and the 
Internet with telecommunications has created a huge area for possible exploitation of 
networked information systems.   
 
B. AGENCIES INVOLVED 
Several agencies or organizations are involved in telecommunications.  The 
following is a listing and brief synopsis of each organization’s role.   
NCS (National Communications System), created after the Cuban Missile crisis in 
1963.  NCS is responsible for making sure the communications systems work.  NCS 
became part of DHS (Department of Homeland Security) in 2003; it had previously been 
in DoD.  Government emergency priority services like GETS, TSP and WPS are 
regulated and authorized by NCS.  Subordinate to NCS is the NCC (National 
Coordinating Center), and within NCC lies NCC-ISAC (the Information Sharing and 
Analysis Center) for the Telecommunications and Information sector.  PDD-63 
established the NCC-ISAC to handle CIP issues.  The wealth of members includes: A&T, 
Cisco Systems, CSC, EDS, ITT, Nortel Networks, SAIC, Sprint, Verizon 
Communications, and WorldCom.  The membership changes over time, but it consists of 
major telecom providers and vendors.107  
                                                 
106 NSTAC (National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee), “Network 
Security/Vulnerability Assessments Task Force Report,” Report (Washington, D.C.: NSTAC, 2002), 28. 
107 National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications. [http://www.ncs.gov/ncc/main.html] 
Accessed September 17, 2005. 
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NTIA (National Telecommunications & Information Administration) was created 
in 1978 under EO 12046. NTIA operates under the Department of Commerce and 
combines the White House Office of  Telecommunications Policy (OTP) with 
Commerce’s Office of Telecommunications.  Their main role has been to sell spectrum to 
telephone, radio, and television companies and to regulate the airwaves.  They have also 
played a major role in the commercialization of the Internet in the late 1990s.  PDD-63 
(1998) designated the U.S. Department of Commerce as the lead agency and the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) as the Sector Liaison 
Official for the Information and Telecommunications Sector. NTIA claims to be 
President George W. Bush’s principal adviser on telecommunications and information 
policy issues.108   
NSTAC (National Security Telecom Advisory Committee) was created in 1982 
under EO 12382.  This is an organization of telephone company CEOs who serve as an 
advisory board to the president on Telecom security matters.  NSTAC has been given a 
governmental oversight role with direct access to President Bush.  Its members are 
currently from BellSouth, Lucent, Unisys, Boeing Company, Microsoft, SBC, Northrop 
Grumman Corp., Qwest, AT&T, SAIC, Bank of America Inc., and others.  The alliance is 
limited to no more than 30 members.109   
PCIPB (President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board) was created under 
EO 13231, Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age on October 16, 2001.  
The order created a federal “critical infrastructure protection” board and charged it with 
recommending policies and coordinating programs for protecting information systems for 
critical infrastructure. The Board’s wide domain includes outreach to the private sector 
and state and local governments, information sharing, incident coordination, and crisis 
response.  Its members are made up of senior officials or their designees from all the 
cabinets of federal government, and all members are employees of the government.110 
                                                 
108 National Telecommunications and Information Administration. [http://www.ntia.doc.gov/] 
Accessed September 17, 2005. 
109 National Communications System. [http://www.ncs.gov/nstac/nstac.html] Accessed September 17, 
2005. 
110 President George W. Bush, White House Executive Order, Information Warfare Site, October 
2001. [http://www.iwar.org.uk/cip/resources/bush/executive-order.htm] Accessed September 17, 2005. 
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NIAC (National Infrastructure Advisory Committee) was also established by EO 
13231, and makes recommendations regarding the security of the cyber and information 
systems of the United States’ national security and economic critical infrastructures.  The 
members represent the major sectors of the economy, including banking and finance, 
transportation, energy, and manufacturing, as well as emergency government services 
from the private sector, academia, and state and local government.  Twenty-four 
individuals sit on this advisory board.111  
NSIE (National Security Information Exchange) was established by a 
recommendation in 1991 from NSTAC and NCS.  The recommendation was to create a 
Government-Industry partnership to reduce vulnerabilities of the nation’s 
telecommunications systems from electronic intrusion.  NSIE serves as a forum in which 
government and industry can share information in a trusted and confidential environment. 
PDD-63 called for the establishment of similar information exchange forums to reduce 
vulnerabilities in all critical infrastructures in 1998.112  
NRIC (the Network Reliability and Interoperability Council), under the FCC, was 
established by Congress in 1993.  The FCC was concerned with the Y2K problem in 
computers and communications equipment.  NRIC was dismantled after the Y2K threat 
diminished, but then was re-chartered in 2002, after the events of 9/11.  Its charter was 
recently reestablished in its seventh iteration, with a new focus on homeland security, 
reliability, and vulnerability analysis.  NRIC seems to be the authoritative source of 
recommendations on security of telecommunications infrastructure, through its list of 801 
best practices.  These are further categorized into the following industry roles:  Service 
Provider, Network Operator, Equipment Supplier, Property Manager, and Government.  
NRIC also has an extensive membership list: Nextel Communications Inc., Alcatel, 
ALLTEL, AT&T, BellSouth Communications, Boeing Company, Cisco Systems, 
Comcast Cable Communications Inc., Ericsson Inc., Level 3 Communications Inc., MCI, 
Lucent Technologies, Microsoft Corporation, Motorola, T-Mobile, Qwest, Verizon 
                                                 
111 President George W. Bush, The White House. Office of the Press Secretary, September 18, 2002. 
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020918–12.html] Accessed September 17, 2005.  
112 National Communications System. [http://www.ncs.gov/nstac/nstac.html] Accessed September 17, 
2005. 
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Communications, and the National Communications System (NCS).  A total of 54 major 
telecommunications companies and organizations make up this seventh edition.113 
CWIN (Critical infrastructure Warning Information Network); NCS developed 
CWIN to facilitate the immediate sharing of critical infrastructure and cyber information 
with government and its industry partners.  It provides a continuous, 24/7 alert and 
notification capability.  Several news releases state that CWIN has no logical dependency 
on the Internet or the public switched network and remains viable under emergency 
conditions, establishing connectivity to the 50 states and District of Columbia.  CWIN 
establishes a strong base for ensuring connectivity between DHS and the states during 
emergencies. This is a classified system and not much is available through OSINT (Open 
Source Intelligence).  There are many similarities to various secure DoD communications 
systems.114 
 
Figure 16.   Telecom C2/Regulatory Structure.115 
 
                                                 
113 National Reliability and Interoperability Council. 
[http://www.nric.org/charter_vii/nric_vii_org.html] Accessed September 17, 2005.  
114 Arrowhead Global Solutions Inc., “Critical infrastructure Warning Information Network (CWIN) 
Connects to All 50 States,” April 14, 2005. [http://www.arrowhead.com/news/detail.php?news_ID=8] 
Accessed September 17, 2005. 
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As diagramed in Figure 1, several agencies oversee telecommunications: the FCC 
with NRIC, Commerce with NTIA, DHS with NCS and, farther down, the NCC-ISAC 
and NSTAC working for the president.  Each organization plays a regulatory role, 
summed up by the following: FCC – spectrum, NTIA – business, executive branch – 
advisory, NCS – operations, and NRIC – security.  Although the template of duties seems 
simplistic, there is much crossover and blurring of the lines in each of these roles and 
responsibilities.  The most influential of these to date in implementation of security 
measures for Telcos are NCS mandates and NRIC’s best practices.   
 
 
C. TELECOMMUNICATION HISTORY/REGULATIONS 
“Mr. Watson — come here — I want to see you."116   
—Alexander Graham Bell, March 10, 1876 
It all started with Alexander Graham Bell and two financiers.  After his invention 
of the telephone in 1876, Bell and the others formed the Bell Telephone Company.  
AT&T became incorporated in 1885, known as the American Telephone and Telegraph 
Corporation, a subsidiary of the American Bell Telephone Company. This Company 
formed a natural monopoly on what is now known as the telecommunications sector.  Ma 
Bell and the Justice Department reached a settlement in 1913, in which AT&T agreed to 
federal regulation as a regulated monopoly.117 
The next attempt to regulate this new medium was in the 1930s under President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt when the Federal Communications Commission was established 
and produced the Communications Act of 1934.  This act was to ensure that the emerging 
radio market would serve the public interest and to prevent domination of the new 
medium by large national monopolies.  Fifty years later, a U.S. district court took a 
dramatic step toward breaking up Ma Bell with the 1984 AT&T divestiture.  This caused  
 
                                                 
116 Alexander Graham Bell, [http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/trr002.html/] Accessed September 
17, 2005. 
117 American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T). [http://www.att.com/history/] Accessed 
September 17, 2005.  
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AT&T to break its local service into seven RBOCs (Regional Bell Operating Companies) 
known as the “Baby Bells”.  AT&T remained in business, providing competitive long-
distance service. 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 sought to bring about competition across 
various telecommunications markets by deregulating the telecommunications 
marketplace.  Since passage of the 1996 act, economic and market conditions and 
technical innovations have helped to bring competition to nationwide markets more so 
than regulatory efforts.118  The act mandated that incumbent carriers open their networks 
to competitors.  Carriers began to concentrate their equipment in colocation facilities and 
buildings, now known as telecom hotels.  Carriers did not have to install their own cables, 
making it less expensive.  These were also peering points for ISPs, which allowed for 
reduced costs when exchanging traffic with other ISPs. 
 
                                                 
118 Federal Communications Commission, “Telecommunications Act of 1996,” 
[http://www.fcc.gov/telecom.html] Accessed September 17, 2005. 
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